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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess natural resource management 
practices in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve (XBR) located in northern China in their 
institutional contexts. The practices of natural resource management in XBR are 
examined through their institutions which include legislation, regulations, and 
administrative structures of the management of XBR, responsibilities associated 
with land and resource rights, decision making powers and processes, and 
community participation. Semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and direct 
observation were employed to analyze resource management practices in XBR and 
institutions impacting these practices. XBR, as an internationally recognized 
biosphere reserve, has not been empowered to meet the goals of improving both the 
conservation of natural ecosystems and the socioeconomic conditions of local 
communities. In this regard, institutions and the interactions between these 
institutions have exerted great impacts on how natural resources are used and 
managed in XBR. Opportunities for improving the management of XBR rest on 
strengthening institutions which impact resource management practices in the 
reserve.  
Partnerships can be applied to characterize an approach to involve both 
interest groups and the general public in natural resource management (Mitchell 
2002). Partnerships can help promote openness, transparency, and equity in 
resource management processes. For XBR, partnerships prove to be an inevitable 
trend for improving its management and facilitating the resolution of a series of 
issues facing XBR including the reserve management organization’s inability to 
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fulfill its conservation functions, complicated power relationships and interest 
conflicts among a wide range of stakeholders, people-park conflicts, and lack of 
community participation in reserve management.  
Locals have experienced great socioeconomic losses accompanied with the 
establishment and management of XBR. However, they have not been provided 
with adequate compensation for their lost benefits. As a consequence, locals have 
resorted to violence for defense of their rights and interests. The conflict between 
XBR and local communities becomes a predominant issue in the reserve. To 
alleviate the conflict and improve reserve management, local communities should 
be involved in the management of XBR. Nonetheless, currently local residents have 
too little say in decision making and resource management given the top-down, 
hierarchical contexts in XBR. In this regard, community-based programs have the 
potential to involve locals in reserve management. Unfortunately, the chance that 
community-based natural resource management regimes will be implemented in 
XBR in the near future seems slim.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Protected areas (PAs) “represent the single most important method of 
conserving biological diversity worldwide” (Brandon and Wells 1992: 557). 
However, the creation of a PA is often accompanied by restrictions on resource use 
and access to the region by local communities. In response to such imposed 
restrictions and the associated lost socioeconomic benefits, local people often take 
actions in the form of resistance to, or conflict with, PA authorities. In addition, PAs 
worldwide, and the biological diversity these areas aim to conserve, are 
increasingly threatened by growing populations, continuing land conversions, and 
degraded natural ecosystems. 
Under such circumstances, the traditional, top-down conservation 
approaches prove to be increasingly inadequate and ineffective in addressing a 
series of issues facing PAs such as the conflicts between local people and these 
areas. “Innovative, well-designed projects at carefully selected sites that 
constructively address local people-park relationships are essential to the 
conservation of biodiversity and thus to sustainable development” (Wells and 
Brandon 1993: 162). Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is 
viewed by many as an alternative approach to bureaucratic conservation. 
CBNRM aims to improve both the conservation of natural ecosystems and 
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the socioeconomic conditions of local communities (Michaelidou et al. 2002). The 
basic principle of community-based programs is to “provide local communities 
with economic incentives and the opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making” (Mayaka 2002: 2001). In particular, in PAs, the provision of 
benefits from conservation activities to communities can improve local support for 
PA conservation and management (McNeely 1995; Michaelidou et al. 2002). The 
conservation objectives of a PA may be better achieved through community-based 
programs, while the welfare of local communities is simultaneously improved. In 
addition, CBNRM appears to be a promising approach to resolve the conflicts 
between PAs and local communities.  
Institutions and the relationships among institutions can play a significant 
role in how natural resources are used and managed (Leach et al. 1999). Institutions 
are viewed as both the rules and the behavior patterns emerging from underlying 
rules or structures (Leach et al. 1999). Institutions can be further divided into 
formal institutions such as legislation and regulations, and informal ones such as 
the rules/norms governing customary resource entitlement. Moreover, an 
evaluation of the practices of natural resource management or community-based 
regimes through a focus on institutions does enable us to “[understand] local-level 
processes and outcomes better” (Agrawal and Gibson 1999: 639). While recently a 
growing number of researchers are engaged in institutional analysis of natural 
resource management (e.g., Gibson 2000; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994) or 
CBNRM (e.g., Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Leach et al. 1999; Wilshusen et al. 
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2002), this study contributes to the literature through the examination of how 
institutions impact the resource use and resource management practices in a PA.  
Partnerships can be applied to characterize an approach to involve both 
interest groups and the general public in natural resource management (Mitchell 
2002). When the management of a PA often involves complicated power 
relationships and interest conflicts among a wide range of interest groups, PA 
managers and their supporting conservation agencies may lack resources or 
capacities to deal with the PA issues alone. On the other side, local communities 
and other stakeholders who are affected by PA management should be provided 
with opportunities to participate in PA management (Gurung 1995). In other words, 
it is unfair for community members or other groups who are affected by PA 
policies or programs to be excluded from the process. “Creation of partnerships is 
usually justified on the basis that they provide for a more open and transparent 
management process, and therefore for greater equity” (Mitchell 2002: 192, 193). 
Partnerships, therefore, can facilitate the resolution of management issues 
confronted by PA managers, on the one hand, and can promote openness, 
transparency, and equity in resource management processes, on the other.  
 
Biosphere reserves    
Biosphere reserves are internationally recognized and included in the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Man 
and the Biosphere (MAB) world network. A biosphere reserve remains under the 
jurisdiction of the nation where it is located and is subject to legislation or other 
institutional arrangements of the country (Batisse 1997). Each biosphere reserve is 
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divided into three kinds of interrelated zones: the core, buffer, and transition zones. 
The core area is under strict protection; surrounding the core areas are the buffer 
zones where activities consistent with conservation goals such as tourism and 
research are allowed; in the transition area, sustainable resource management 
practices are promoted and local communities are involved (Batisse 1997). Further, 
biosphere reserves are designated to fulfill three complementary functions: 
conservation, development, and logistic support (Figure 1). Thus they represent 
conservation areas where ideas of CBNRM can be explored.  
 
Figure 1: The three functions of biosphere reserves (Source: UNESCO 2005) 
 
1.2 Research question and objectives 
The overall purpose of this study is to assess natural resource management 
practices in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve (XBR) located in northern China in their 
institutional contexts. In response to this purpose, the study is guided by a central 
research question: Is the biosphere reserve empowered to meet the goals of 
community-based natural resource management through formal and informal 
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institutions? 
To answer the research question, the specific objectives are to:  
1. Assess the formal institutions in relation to natural resource 
management in XBR, which include:  
A) The legislation, regulations, and administrative structures of the 
management of XBR  
B) Responsibilities associated with land and resource rights 
C) Decision making powers and processes  
2. Assess the informal institutions - community participation in natural 
resource management - in XBR;  
3. Evaluate the potential for the application of a CBNRM regime in XBR.  
Based on these explorations, policy recommendations will be provided on 
how to improve the management of XBR by strengthening both formal and 
informal institutions.  
 
1.3 Study area 
The XBR, located in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in China 
(43°26´~ 44°34´N and 115°30´~ 117°12´E) (Figure 2), is by far the largest of the 
country’s 26 biosphere reserves included into the international MAB network, 
covering an area of 10,786 km2. It lies at the southeast Mongolian Plateau, 
bordering the low mountains and hill regions of the west Daxing-An Mountain to 
the east. The area of the reserve was designated in correspondence to the catchment 
of the lower reach of Xilin River, an inland river in the east Inner Mongolian 
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Plateau (Thwaites et al. 1998). The reserve was established in 1985 as a provincial 
(autonomous region) level nature reserve to protect the most representative 
grassland ecosystem in the Inner Mongolian Plateau (Han et al. 2002). In 1987, it 
was accepted into the international MAB network and became a biosphere reserve. 
In 1997, the State Council decreed it to be a national level nature reserve namely 
Xilingol National Grassland Nature Reserve. 
 
Figure 2: Map of Xilingol Biosphere Reserve (Adapted from Pamphlet on 
Xilingol Grassland Nature Reserve) 
In this research, XBR was chosen as the site of case study because among 
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China’s 26 biosphere reserves included into the world network of biosphere 
reserves, XBR was one of the first designated1. The relatively longer existence of 
XBR than most of China’s other biosphere reserves enables me to assess the 
impacts of XBR’s designation on resource management practices over a longer 
time range. In addition, because of its longer existence, along with the growing 
focus on grassland degradation in academic and policy fields in China, until now 
there has been a larger amount of research on XBR than on many of other 
biosphere reserves in the country. For example, the Inner Mongolian Grassland 
Ecological Research Station has implemented research on XBR since 1979. So 
compared to many of other biosphere reserves in China, there are more data sources 
for XBR. Moreover, there is relatively more literature on XBR, to which this study 
can contribute. 
The elevation of XBR ranges from about 900 to 1500 meters (m) above sea 
level. The topography is higher in the southeast and descends towards the 
northwest, with the lowest elevation of 902 m above sea level situated at the lower 
reach of Xilin River Basin. The landscape of the reserve appears to be a patchwork 
of smooth lava tablelands, low mountains, hills, plateaus, and sand lands. 
Additionally, XBR is dominated by a continental, subhumid, temperate grassland 
climate which increases in aridity from the southeast to the northwest. The climate 
of the region is cold and dry in winter, and relatively warm and wet in summer. 
Rainfall varies in the region between about 200 mm and 500 mm per annum, with a 
mean annual rainfall of 350 mm. Seventy percent of the annual precipitation falls 
                                                        
1 Among China’s 26 biosphere reserves accepted into the international MAB network, Changbaishan, 
Dinghushan, Wolong, and Fanjinshan Biosphere Reserves were accepted into the MAB programme before 
XBR’s designation as an international biosphere reserve. Changbaishan Biosphere Reserve was China’s first 
internationally recognized biosphere reserve. It was designated in 1979. 
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between July and September (Han et al. 2002). 
The dominant ecosystem type in XBR is the temperate grassland ecosystem, 
which constitutes approximately 90% of the reserve’s total area, along with other 
types of ecosystems including the sandy-forest ecosystem, the agricultural 
ecosystem, the moorland ecosystem, and others (Han et al. 2002). In addition, the 
considerable variations in climate and soil give rise to great habitat and species 
diversity in the region. About 76 bird species and 33 animal species, with 
endangered species including Red-crowned Crane (Grus japonensis), White Stork 
(Ciconia ciconia), Great Bustard (Otis tarda), and Pallas’s Fishing Eagle 
(Haliaeetus leucoryphus), have been found in the reserve. In addition, there are 
over 800 plant species found in the area, with Stipa grandis, Stipakrylovii, and 
Aneurolepidium chinese most abundant in the region (Han et al. 2002).    
Furthermore, XBR is home to about 200,000 people, with the population 
having almost doubled since the reserve’s establishment in 1985. The population is 
concentrated in Xilinhot Municipality where some 150,000 people live, with the 
remaining population dispersing in XBR’s other regions. The Han Chinese 
constitutes the largest group, followed by the Mongolian Minority, among other 
minority ethnic groups. Animal husbandry is the pillar industry of local economy, 
with rangeland encompassing about 80% of the reserve’s total area (Han et al. 
2002). Other primary economic sectors in the reserve include agriculture, tourism, 
and industry, etc.  
In so far as the administrative structure is concerned, the whole reserve area 
is in the jurisdiction of Xilinhot City, which is within the territory of Xilingol 
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League2. XBR consists of the following administrative units: Xilinhot Municipality, 
the livestock farms3 of Baiinxile, Maodeng, and Beilike, the northern portion of 
Baiinkulun Livestock Farm, Yilit Township (sumu), the eastern portion of 
Aershanbaolit Township (sumu), and a part of Xiwuzhumuqin and Abaga banners4 
(qi).  
 
Functional areas 
XBR is divided into four kinds of functional areas: the core, buffer, 
transition, and experimental zones. The reserve has five core areas (Table 1 and 
Figure 2), with a total area of 18.5 km2, approximately 0.17% of the reserve’s total 
area. Compared to many other biosphere reserves, the ratio of the total area of core 
zones in XBR is quite small, which may have some impact on the institutions and 
resource uses in these core areas. This may also lead to the differences of 
institutions and resource management practices in the core areas between XBR and 
other biosphere reserves. In addition, five buffer zones, covering a total area of 56 
km2 (0.52% of XBR’s total area), are centrically surrounding the five core areas up 
to 1 km of radiums respectively and thus form five relatively narrow rings around 
the core areas (refer to Table 1). Outside the buffer zones is the transition area, 
inside which experimental zones are set up. These experimental zones provide 
space for field research and demonstration functions. Most of them are situated 
near the core or buffer zones. In total there are five types of experimental zones in 
the reserve including the demonstration areas for livestock husbandry, hay 
                                                        
2 Mongolian minority administrative levels, equal to prefecture. 
3 A Livestock Farm is equal to a county in terms of administrative levels. 
4 Mongolian minority administrative levels, equal to county. 
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harvesting, cultivated meadow, rehabilitating degraded grasslands, and grassland 
ecosystem.    
Table 1: The core areas and buffer zones in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve 
Core Area Area of 
Core Area 
(km2) 
Area of 
Buffer Zone 
(km2) 
Location of the Core Area 
and Buffer Zone 
Core Area of Meadow 
Grassland Ecosystem in 
Chaganaobao 
5.5 15 Baiinxile Livestock Farm 
Core Area of Grassland 
Ecosystem on Basalt Tableland 
in Bayanwula  
5.5 20 Baiinxile Livestock Farm 
Beilike Livestock Farm 
Core Area of Typical Grassland 
Ecosystem on the Hailiute Plain
5.5 15 Xiwuzhumuqin Banner (qi) 
Core Area of Peace Meyeri in 
Taowuyintaolegai 
1 3 Baiinxile Livestock Farm 
Core Area of Populus 
Davidiana and Betula 
Plytyphylla in the Abutouer 
Mountain 
1 3 Baiinxile Livestock Farm 
Total Area  18.5 56  
As presented in Table 1, four out of five XBR’s core and buffer zones are 
situated within Baiinxile Livestock Farm (BLF), a state-owned farm encompassing 
a total area of 3,730 km2. The total population within the farm is now over 11,000 
people, including some 5,500 staff members and about 6,000 of their family 
members5. The population in the farm has increased considerably since its 
foundation in 1950 when the farm had only 20 staff. The Livestock Farm is 
equivalent to a ‘county’ for administrative purposes, with the farm director being 
equivalent to the head of the county government in administrative rank. Further, the 
farm consists of 6 subfarms which are equivalent to townships in terms of 
                                                        
5 Interviews with the managers from BLF. 
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administrative units. The 6 subfarms have been merged from the previous 12 
subfarms for management purposes.   
 
1.4 Thesis organization 
The thesis is organized as follows. Reviews of the CBNRM, institutions, 
and partnerships literature are presented in Chapter 2, along with the research 
methods used for this study. The legislative frameworks and administrative 
structures for the management of XBR are examined in Chapter 3, and particularly, 
organizational roles and dynamics of different organizations responsible for reserve 
management are described. Chapter 4 presents land rights and land use conflicts in 
XBR within the context of land rights and grassland conditions in the country. 
Chapter 5 explores the institutions of decision making and community participation 
in natural resource management in XBR. More specifically, it presents decision 
making powers and processes in XBR, the trend of the XBR toward the formation 
of partnerships for reserve management, an evaluation of the level of community 
participation in XBR, and a discussion of community participation mechanisms 
applied in the reserve. Concluding statements and recommendations are made in 
Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
Three bodies of literature throw light upon this research. Section 2.1.1 
examines the concepts of community and the evolving representations of 
communities in the literature on resource management and conservation, followed 
by a brief description of CBNRM theories. Definitions of institutions are clarified 
in Section 2.1.2, along with the description of the relationships between institutions 
and natural resource management. In this section, the institutions I will explore in 
this study are also listed. These institutions influence resource management 
practices and resource uses in XBR. Finally, Section 2.1.3 provides a partnership 
framework to present the partnership theories in relation to PA management, and to 
guide the exploration of institutions of decision making and community 
participation in the study. The section also presents key elements for successful 
partnerships, Arnstein’s ladder of civic involvement, and public participation 
mechanisms.  
 
2.1.1 Community-based natural resource management 
Concept of community 
In the sociological literature, there is a wide variety of definitions of 
community including community of place, community of interest, and community 
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of attachment (Carroll 1995; Crowe and Allan 1994). For the purpose of this study, 
I focus on the concepts and representations of community in the literature on 
resource management and conservation.  
“[T]he history of community in conservation is also a history of 
revisionism” (Agrawal and Gibson 1999: 631). During the period of coercive, 
state-centered resource management strategies, communities were seen as obstacles 
to conservation of natural resources because the livelihood of community members 
depended on these resources (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Since the 1980s, such 
images of communities have radically changed both among international donor 
agencies and in academic fields; communities can become good stewards of natural 
resources if local residents are involved in managing these resources (e.g., Gibson 
et al. 2000; Singleton and Taylor 1992).  
The early work that resurrected the central role of communities in 
conservation and management of natural resources shared a series of assumptions 
about community, environment, and their relationships (Leach et al. 1999). “Such 
communities are seen as relatively homogeneous, with members’ shared 
characteristics distinguishing them from “outsiders”” (Leach et al. 1999: 228). 
Communities were assumed to have existed in harmony and equilibrium with their 
environment until the intervention of factors from the outside world (Leach et al. 
1999).  
Such visions of communities, however, were criticized by many researchers 
as oversimplified (e.g., Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Belsky 1999; Leach et al.1999; 
Li 1996; Li 2002). They argued that such representations of communities as small, 
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homogeneous, and having shared norms and identities ignore the complexity and 
differentiation inherent in these communities, where both internal and external 
actors intervene in the process of natural resource management (Agrawal and 
Gibson 1999; Leach et al. 1999; Li 1996). Furthermore, such images of 
communities may lead to poor outcomes on the ground. “[T]heir oversimplification 
and flawed basic assumptions mean they serve as poor and misleading guides for 
translation into operational strategies and programs” (Leach et al. 1999: 229). 
Rather than achieving their goals of increasingly empowering communities in 
resource management, they may undermine these goals by advocating such 
representations for communities (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Instead, these 
researchers advocated a distinct representation of community. Leach et al. (1999), 
for instance, emphasized that there exist “diverse and often conflicting values and 
resource priorities” (230) in communities.  
Concerning the concept of community adopted in this study, the “territorial 
community” concept is applied. “Willmott (1986, ch. 6) suggests that basically 
‘community’ refers to people having something in common, and that this shared 
element is often understood geographically; he terms this ‘territorial community’ or 
‘place community’” (Crowe and Allan 1994: 3). Further, “[w]hether or not they are 
regarded as comprising a single community depends on one’s perspective and scale 
of analysis” (Leach et al. 1999: 230). This study focuses on assessing natural 
resource management practices in XBR. XBR has a defined geographic location 
and its own geographic boundary. People in XBR live in a same biosphere reserve. 
Living within the same geographic boundary of XBR is their shared character. So 
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my “perspective and scale of analysis” make me define XBR as “a single 
community.”  
Additionally, in light of the recent work in the literature on resource 
management and conservation, XBR is seen as a dynamic and internally 
differentiated community within the reserve border, in which the social actors with 
different interests and political powers interact with each other and with external 
actors. More specifically, while they reside within the same boundary (of the 
biosphere reserve), people in XBR are highly heterogeneous in identities, interests, 
and power relations, etc. There exist complex and dynamic interactions between 
differentiated social actors in XBR, and between these peoples with “outsiders” 
such as governments at various levels, transnational corporations, or other 
communities.   
 
Community-based natural resource management in theory 
CBNRM is a paradigm shift from top-down and authoritarian resource 
management regimes. It has attracted the attention of national governments, donor 
agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) since the 1980s. The 
apparent failure of the state-led conservation/development policies and practices 
led to a growing emphasis on local participation (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; 
Kellert et al. 2000; Taylor 1998; Western and Wright 1994). In addition, an 
increasing focus on “government decentralization, devolution to local communities 
of responsibility for natural resources held as commons, and community 
participation” (Leach et al. 1999: 225) has given rise to CBNRM.  
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CBNRM has the following features: (1) integration of socioeconomic 
development with biodiversity conservation; (2) involvement of community 
members in resource management and conservation; (3) devolution of power and 
control from state governments to local communities; (4) endeavors to defend or 
strive for the legitimacy of local resource and property rights (Kellert et al. 2000). 
Community-based programs and policies are based on the premises that local 
residents have more vested interest in sustainable resource use and management, 
and they know more about local ecological conditions and processes than states or 
distant corporations, so they are more appropriate to manage local resources 
(Belsky 1999; Brosius et al. 1998; Li 2002).  
Yet, rhetoric aside, the practical implementation of community-based 
policies or programs often falls short of expectation (Kellert et al. 2000). While 
many issues have been pointed out to explain the failure of these community-based 
programs, such as “a tendency for projects to be too short-term in nature and 
overreliant on expatriate expertise” (Leach et al. 1999: 226), the most frequently 
mentioned is the oversimplification of the images of communities (e.g., Leach et al. 
1999; Li 1996). For example, some researchers argued that the oversimplified and 
flawed assumptions of CBNRM have misled the operators of such 
community-based programs (e.g., Leach et al. 1999; Li 1996).  
In response to this issue, these scholars examined community-based policies 
and programs in their specific political, economic, and social contexts (e.g., Belsky 
1999; Brechin et al. 2002; Brosius et al. 1998; Kellert et al. 2000; Lane and 
Rickson 1997; Leach et al. 1999; Li 2002; Wilshusen et al. 2002). “[B]oth 
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advocates and analysts must remain alert to the contested and changing variety of 
cultural and political agendas and contexts in which these programs are being 
imagined or implemented” (Brosius et al. 1998: 159). The concerns raised here led 
to a new theoretical approach for examining CBNRM. Some scholars attempted to 
evaluate and improve the practices of CBNRM through a specific focus on 
institutions (e.g., Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Leach et al.1999; Wilshusen et al. 
2002). “To date, a poor understanding of such dynamic institutional arrangements 
has impeded practical efforts in CBNRM” (Leach et al. 1999: 226). Therefore, an 
institutional analysis of resource management practices or CBNRM enables us to 
evaluate these practices from a more effective perspective and thus to understand 
the practices better.  
 
2.1.2 Institutions 
A growing number of researchers have engaged themselves in institutional 
analysis of natural resource management and community-based regimes, concerned 
with both policies and practices. For instance, when examining community-based 
regimes, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) advocated a focus on institutions rather than 
on communities, the images of which are frequently oversimplified. They (1999) 
further argued that “[a] focus on institutions does not necessarily lead to better 
outcomes (more biodiversity, more biomass, sustainable stock levels, etc.) but it 
does offer the tools for understanding local-level processes and outcomes better” 
(639).  
Moreover, in the literature which assesses CBNRM through a focus on 
institutional arrangements, different concepts of institutions are adopted. 
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“Institutions can be seen as sets of formal and informal rules and norms that shape 
interactions of humans with others and nature” (Agrawal and Gibson 1999: 637). 
Leach et al. (1999) “view institutions not as the rules themselves, but as regularized 
patterns of behavior that emerge from underlying structures or sets of “rules in 
use”” (237). Cortner et al. (2001) adopted Ostrom’s definition viewing institutions 
“not only in terms of organization and structure, but also as sets of rules and 
standards of behavior” (68).  
The three concepts mentioned above are different in the scales of 
institutions. Compared to Agrawal and Gibson (1999) as well as Cortner et al. 
(2001), Leach et al. (1999) adopted a relatively broader concept of institutions. 
They (1999) regarded institutions at different scales and the interactions between 
these institutions acting as critical roles in impacting who gains access to and 
control over local resources, and how these resources are used and managed. 
The relationships among these institutions and between scale 
levels is of central importance in influencing which social actors 
- both those within the community and those at some 
considerable remove from it - gain access to and control over 
local resources. In turn they influence the uses to which 
resources are put and the ways they are managed, and thus 
progressively help to modify and shape the landscape over time. 
(Leach et al. 1999: 234) 
For the purpose of this study, I adopt Leach et al. (1999)’s definition 
because compared to institutions’ concept defined by Agrawal and Gibson (1999), 
Leach et al. (1999) included people’s behavior patterns into the concept. In this 
research, both “rules” and resource management practices that “emerge” from the 
underlying rules are evaluated. In addition, both of the two articles (i.e., Agrawal 
and Gibson 1999; Leach et al. 1999) define institutions as formal and informal 
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rules and norms. For example, Leach et al. (1999) made a further distinction 
between formal and informal institutions. 
Formal institutions may be thought of as rules that require 
exogenous enforcement by a third-party organization…Informal 
institutions, however, may be endogenously enforced; they are 
upheld by mutual agreement among the social actors involved, 
or by relations of power and authority between them. (Leach et 
al. 1999: 238) 
Furthermore, institutions are not fixed but are constantly shaped and 
reshaped by the behaviors of social actors, and institutional changes may occur 
when individuals act to challenge their forms (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Leach et 
al. 1999). Such character of institutions is in accordance with what is called 
“dynamic of institutions” in the literature.  
In light of these studies in the literature, I examine the practices of natural 
resource management in XBR through their institutions which include the 
legislation, regulations and administrative structures, responsibilities associated 
with land and resource rights, decision making powers and processes, and 
community participation. Based on theories of Leach et al. (1999), these 
institutions and the interactions between them play a critical role in resource uses 
and resource management practices in XBR.   
  
2.1.3 Decision making through partnerships 
PAs often imply the existence of complicated interest/authority conflicts 
across a broad range of interest groups and stakeholders. The resolution of the 
conflicts over PA management and particularly those related to large bioregions 
often requires shared managerial authority and responsibilities among a wide range 
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of agencies holding various mandates (Barborak 1995). The partnership proves to 
be one way by which conflicts between different agencies and organizations can be 
resolved and shared decision making on PA management achieved. Adopting 
Mitchell (2002)’s definition,   
A partnership is a mutually agreed arrangement between two or 
more public, private or non-governmental organizations to 
achieve a jointly determined goal or objective, or to implement a 
jointly determined activity, for the benefit of the environment 
and society (182).  
At this point, Mitchell (2002)’s “consultative partnerships” are particularly 
put forward to shed light on this study. Consultative partnerships are one type of 
alliances which are categorized on the basis of the degree of participation and 
extent of power sharing among partners6 (Mitchell 2002). In consultative 
partnerships, the government agency actively gathers input from partners which can 
exert great influence on decision-makings, while it is the government agency that 
retains control and decides to what extent the advice from partners will be 
incorporated into decisions (Mitchell 2002). A consultative partnership always 
takes the form of a committee or council which is established to provide input to 
the government agency regarding a specified issue (Mitchell 2002).  
The purpose of partnerships is to achieve compatible objectives (Mitchell 
2002). In this regard, while different organizations may have diverse objectives and 
interests, these objectives and interests can be compatible (Murphree 1994). For 
                                                        
6 Four types of strategic alliances including contributory partnerships, operational partnerships, consultative 
partnerships, and collaborative partnerships are presented by Mitchell (2002). These different types of alliances 
are identified according to the degrees of participation and extent of power sharing among partners. For 
instance, while contributory partnerships involve limited level of participation of partners who provide support 
typically in terms of funding to the partnerships, in operational partnerships, partners participate in practical 
work and can influence decision making (Mitchell 2002). And collaborative partnerships are the only one of the 
four partnerships in which government gives up a part of its control and authority to other partners (Mitchell 
2002). 
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instance, different groups in a PA may have a common goal of environmental 
stewardship since it can bring about a flow of benefits such as fresh air, improved 
natural ecosystems, growing agricultural or livestock products, and others. In 
addition, these diverse groups may enjoy different kinds of benefits from 
environmental stewardship. For example, tourists enjoy the fresh air and the scenic 
landscape in the PA. PA practitioners and conservation agencies can have well 
conserved species and habitats as an indication of their working performance. And 
local inhabitants benefit from the improved natural environment surrounding their 
places of living. More importantly, the growing agricultural or livestock 
productivity associated with the improved biological conditions can result in an 
improved standard of living. Therefore, certain PA issues “can bring together 
frequently “diverse” sector interests” (Murphree 1994: 405).    
At this time, the research utilizes a framework provided by Venter and 
Breen (1998) to present the theories of partnerships as related to PA settings, to 
guide the assessment of institutions of decision making and community 
participation in XBR, and to shed light on the recommendations from this study in 
terms of improving partnerships for XBR’s management. Venter and Breen 
(1998)’s partnership framework for PA management is based on the overlap 
between different needs and interests of PA staff, local residents, and other local 
entities (Figure 3). PA staff aim to fulfill their conservation roles and functions, 
while local community members and other local entities seek to improve their 
socioeconomic conditions (Venter and Breen 1998). Moreover, conservation and 
development do not contradict with one another; these two goals can be mutually 
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compatible. A management partnership between PA staff and local communities, in 
turn, can be established on the basis of their different but compatible objectives and 
interests.    
 
Figure 3: Conceptual representation of the different interests that characterize 
the involvement of protected area staff, local community members, and other 
local entities (Adapted from Venter and Breen 1998: 809) 
Figure 3 illustrates the partnership between PA staff and local communities. 
In this research, partnerships are applied in a broader sense, which involve more 
partners including PA staff, different governments/government agencies, 
non-government sectors, local communities/other local entities, and other interest 
groups or stakeholders. Therefore, Figure 3 is expanded in Figure 4 to include 
additional partners into the partnership for PA management. Furthermore, in the 
partnership framework presented in Figure 4, local communities are regarded as an 
important partner in the management of PAs. So in this study, community 
Overlap of 
interests
Protected area staff
Local community members 
and other local entities 
CONSERVATION Activity LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
Level of 
interest 
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Issues which will be 
addressed by the 
PARTNERSHIP 
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participation can be viewed as a part of decision making in PA management, while 
it implies the involvement of local communities in decision making processes. The 
institutions of decision making and community participation, therefore, are 
inseparable. In this regard, Figure 4 provides a framework to guide the assessment 
of institutions of decision making and community participation in XBR.  
 Figure 4: The partnership framework for the management of protected areas (Adapted from Venter and Breen 1998: 
813) 
Regional / National 
Conservation 
Agency 
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The formation of partnerships often presents many challenges. The 
establishment of partnerships requires that governments and their agencies devolve 
at least part of their authority and decision making powers. However, “the inbuilt 
tendency of government structures is to assert power and claim authority, even 
when they lack the resources to fulfill the implied responsibilities” (Murphree 1994: 
415). This is particularly the case when partnerships are to be built across 
jurisdictional boundaries. Government agencies and other organizations tend to be 
reluctant to share powers beyond their own jurisdictions since they fear the 
formation of collaborative relationships may threaten their decision making powers, 
administrative discretion, and economic interests, etc. (Gray et al. 2001). As a result, 
if the partnerships are to succeed, all partners must gain, or at least, perceive to gain, 
some benefits from such collaborative relationships (Gray et al. 2001; Mitchell 
2002). Besides shared benefits among all partners, there are also other elements 
important for successful partnerships, which are provided by Mitchell (2002) and 
are presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Key elements for successful partnerships 
Elements Description 
Compatibility 
between 
participants 
Such compatibility often is based on respect and trust, even 
when legitimately different expectations or needs exist. 
With respect and trust, differences can often be overcome, 
and indeed can be used to help each participant to broaden 
his or her outlook.   
Benefits to all 
partners 
If there are no real benefits to all the participants, and if 
they are not perceived to be shared fairly, then a sustained 
partnership will be difficult to achieve.  
Equitable 
representation and 
power 
Equitable representation and power for participants need to 
be agreed upon and established. Even though some partners 
may have fewer resources or capacity than others, means 
must be found to ensure that all partners are involved. 
Communication 
mechanisms 
There is a need both to facilitate communication internally 
between the partners, and with groups external to the 
partnership.  
Adaptability Adaptability, especially given the uncertainty and changing 
circumstances that often are encountered in resource and 
environmental issues. A willingness to be flexible and to 
learn from experience…usually is a strong advantage.  
Integrity, patience 
and perseverance 
by partners 
Obstacles often will be encountered, frustration will occur, 
progress will be slow or slowed down, and sighs of 
progress may not appear for some time. These elements, 
combined with trust and respect, allow partners to get 
through the difficult times which inevitably occur.  
Source: Mitchell 2002: 186. 
As is referred to above, in this study, the institutions of decision making and 
community participation are analyzed on the basis of the partnership framework 
presented in Figure 4. The framework includes almost all important interest groups 
and stakeholders in PA management. Therefore, all of the groups, one of which is 
local communities, listed in the framework should be involved in decision making 
and management of XBR. This study particularly analyzes the institution of 
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community participation because I regard local communities as one of the most 
important stakeholders in PA management. Additionally, community participation 
is a significant institution to explore, if the practices of natural resource 
management in XBR are to be clearly assessed. Further, many of the management 
issues in PAs such as the conflicts between PAs and local communities are closely 
linked to problems facing community participation in these areas. The problems 
confronted by the institution of community participation include the inadequate 
degree of community participation and ineffective community participation 
mechanisms used in PAs, among others.  
In this regard, Arnstein’s ladder of civic involvement (Table 3) is 
informative for the evaluation of the level of community participation in a PA. 
Arnstein’s ladder of civic involvement describes different degrees of public 
participation ranging from non-participation to full community control, based on 
the extent to which communities share powers in decision making. While 
“manipulation” and “therapy” aim at educating or curing people rather than 
involving them, “informing” and “consultation” enable people to be informed and 
to provide feedback which tends to be ignored (Arnstein 1969). At the level of 
“placation,” communities are allowed to offer advice yet with limited power in 
decision making; communities’ decision making authority increases from 
“partnership” to “delegated power” and “citizen control,” at which people 
participate in planning and management with growing powers (Arnstein 1969). 
Arnstein’s ladder of civic involvement can provide a reference scheme to help 
assess the existence or lack of community participation as well as the degree and 
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extent of community participation in decision making and resource management in 
a PA. 
Table 3: Arnstein’s ladder of civic involvement 
Rungs on the ladder 
of citizen 
participation  
Nature of involvement  Degree of power 
sharing 
1. Manipulation Rubberstamp committees  
2. Therapy Power holders educate or cure 
citizens 
Non-participation 
3. Informing Citizens’ rights and options are 
identified 
 
4. Consultation  Citizens are heard but not 
necessarily heeded 
Degrees of tokenism 
5. Placation Advice is received from citizens 
but not acted upon 
 
6. Partnership Trade-offs are negotiated  
7. Delegated power Citizens are given management 
power for selected or all parts of 
programmes  
Degrees of citizen 
power 
8. Citizen control    
Source: Arnstein 1969 as cited in Mitchell 2002: 187. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, to promote community participation in PA 
management, effective mechanisms for community participation are greatly needed. 
This is because effective community participation mechanisms can facilitate 
information sharing and shared decision making between local communities and 
decision makers such as government agencies in PA management. They, in turn, 
can help involve community members in conservation and management of PAs. At 
this point, Mitchell (2002)’s public participation mechanisms (Table 4) are quite 
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informative.  
Table 4: Public participation mechanisms 
 Representativeness Information 
in  
Information 
out  
Continuous 
exchange 
Ability to 
make 
decisions
Public meetings Poor Poor Good  Poor Poor-fair 
Task force Poor Good Good Good Fair-good
Advisory groups Poor-good Poor-good Poor-good Good Fair 
Social surveys Good Poor Fair Poor  Poor 
Individual/group 
submissions 
Poor Good Poor Poor Poor 
Litigation Poor-fair Good Good Poor Good 
Arbitration Poor-fair Good Good Poor Good 
Environmental 
mediation 
Poor-fair Good Good Fair Good 
Lobbying Poor-fair Good Fair Good Fair 
Source: Mitchell 2002: 193. 
Mitchell (2002) presented diverse mechanisms that can be used for public 
participation. These mechanisms are diverse in their strengths/weaknesses in terms 
of soliciting public input, facilitating communication, and the ability to make 
decisions. For instance, the abilities of public meetings to facilitate communication 
are limited, and their representativeness is relatively poor. A task force is good at 
facilitating two-way communication and information sharing between decision 
makers and the public. The strengths of social surveys rest on their broad 
resprentativeness and their potentials to encourage public input. And the advisory 
group is a participatory approach by which a group is commonly created to 
investigate a problem (Mitchell 2002). This table suggests, then, that there is no 
single, effective way to engage citizens. Rather the choice of mechanism may vary 
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according to the purpose of the exchange.  
 
2.2 Research methods 
2.2.1 Research strategies 
To explore resource management practices in XBR and how these practices 
are impacted by their institutions, a case study approach is utilized in this research. 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994: 13). In this study, natural resource 
management practices in XBR are assessed within their institutional context.  
According to Yin (1994), one of the most frequently cited problems facing 
the use of case studies is the difficulty in generalizing research findings (Yin 1994). 
In this study, a principle of using the case study approach is based on what Yin 
(1994) put forward, that case studies are intended to generalize in a theoretical 
rather than a statistical nature. In other words, the case study is applied to explore 
and expand theories, which in this study include the theories of CBNRM, 
institutions, and partnerships. Additionally, as natural resource management is a 
highly context-based phenomenon and may change according to different social, 
economic, and political settings, the findings from this study are not directly 
applicable to other locations. 
Moreover, a major strength of case study research is that researchers can 
take advantage of using multiple sources of evidence. Yin (1994) argued that 
various data sources are complementary, and thus using multiple sources of 
 30
evidence in a case study “allows an investigator to address a broader range of 
historical, attitudinal, and behavioral issues” (92). He further claimed that the 
findings and inferences in a case study would be more convincing if they were 
based on various data sources. This is consistent with what Patton (1990) suggested, 
that different data sources can be used to complement and validate the findings of 
one another. 
 
2.2.2 Data collection and data analysis 
Based on the fieldwork conducted in the summer, 2004, data for the case 
study in XBR were collected from three main data sources: semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis, and direct observation. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews can help us gain access to people’s experiences, opinions, and 
perspectives (Bradshaw and Stratford 2000; Kitchin and Tate 2002; Patton 2002). 
An interview is “most appropriately used in situations in which an in-depth 
knowledge of issues and relationships is needed” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 
103). In this study, to explore diverse experiences and opinions held by people in 
XBR toward certain resource management issues, an interview approach serves as 
the most important dimension of the three data collection methods applied.     
Additionally, among different interview strategies ranging from 
unstructured and open-ended to structured and closed-ended interviews, the 
semi-structured approach and open-ended questions were selected for the purpose 
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of this study. Semi-structured interviews provide a useful research method that not 
only enables interviewers to maintain some flexibility in exploring specific issues 
but ensures all topics of interest will be covered (Kitchin and Tate 2002). In this 
approach, interviews are guided by questions, topics, or both, which are specified 
in advance. For example, this study used interview questions listed under different 
topics, as presented in Appendix I. Further, open-ended questions were applied in 
this study to elicit more responses and information from respondents than what the 
closed questions can.  
A total of fourteen face-to-face interviews with key informants were carried 
out in the summer, 2004. Key informants were contacted based on their 
involvement in natural resource management in XBR. Nine of them were members 
of the XBR Management Bureau, and five were managers from BLF. All the 
interviews were conducted in respondents’ place of work. An interview schedule 
(see Appendix I) was used in the fieldwork. One of the advantages of the interview 
schedule is to make sure that “all issues are covered as appropriately as possible” 
(Dunn 2000: 56). The topics covered in the interviews, which include organization, 
land and resource rights, decision making, community participation, and biosphere 
reserve, along with the questions under each topic, are listed in the schedule.  
Prior to the interview, I provided each potential respondent with a written 
introduction which clarified the purpose of my research and the interview 
conditions, an interview schedule listing the questions and themes to be covered 
during the interview, and a consent form. At the beginning of the interviews, I 
reviewed the purpose of my research with respondents, and clarified both the 
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confidentiality of the interviews and respondents’ rights to withdraw from the study 
at any time. The interviews were audiotaped. All microcassettes have been locked 
and stored in a locked cabinet in Dr. Bell’s office (They will be kept for a minimum 
of five years). During the interviews, I also took field notes by hand to “supply 
pertinent information about the circumstances of the interview not captured by the 
recording” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 63). Field notes and audiotapes were 
transcribed at the intervals between interviews during the fieldwork and after I 
returned to Canada.  
 
Document analysis  
In this study, the information from interviews was complemented with the 
review and analysis of relevant documents. Documents can provide basic 
information for the research (Patton 1990). Further, document analysis can help 
cross-check and complement information from other data sources (Yin 1994). But 
on the other hand, while documents are useful sources of data, they should be 
applied with particular understanding of their inherent subjectivity and bias 
(Kitchin and Tate 2002; Patton 1990; Yin 1994). 
In this research, documentary evidences include a variety of materials 
ranging from reserve management plans to propaganda pamphlets, some of which 
are listed below.  
● Management Plans (1999 and 2003) for XBR 
● Official reports on grassland degradation in Xilingol League 
● Regulation on Xilingol National Grassland Nature Reserve 
 33
● Other legislation and regulations7 in relation to nature reserve 
management, grassland management, and land and resource tenure 
● Pamphlets on XBR and BLF 
● Scholarly works  
“In qualitative research, the number of people we interview, communities 
we observe, or texts we read is less important than the quality of who or what we 
involve in our research, and how we conduct that research” (Bradshaw and 
Stratford 2000: 38). On the other hand, how many and what documents to read was 
still an issue I had to deal with before document analysis was implemented. This 
decision depends heavily on the purpose of the inquiry and it is also affected by the 
availability of time and resources for researchers (Bradshaw and Stratford 2000). 
Based the statements above, while there are a great number of documents 
that seem relevant to the theme of my research, I chose to review and analyze 
documents which are closely linked with the purpose and objectives of this study. 
More specifically, I chose documents that can provide me with insight into natural 
resource management practices in XBR and their institutions. In other words, I paid 
attention to and pulled out information relevant to the legislation, regulations and 
administrative structures of the management of XBR, land and resource rights, 
decision making and community participation, and resource use and resource 
management practices in XBR.  
Finally, the analysis of documents was triangulated with the interview 
transcripts. To evaluate the validity of the information from documents, I 
                                                        
7 They include the Nature Reserve Regulation, the Principle for Categories and Grades of Nature Reserves, the 
Land Management Rule for Nature Reserves, the Regulation for Forest and Wildlife Reserves, the Regulation 
on Grassland Management in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Prevention and Treatment of Desertification, and the Rangeland Law.  
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cross-checked the documents with the information from interviews. In particular, I 
paid attention to both the consistency and inconsistency of the information from 
these two data collection approaches. Inferences and findings were attained from 
consistent information. For the inconsistent information, I reviewed and analyzed 
additional documents to provide further clarification. At this point, different 
documents may be not consistent with each other concerning the statement of 
certain issues. Information from interviews, in turn, were used to help cross-check 
the validity of analysis of documents regarding particular issues.  
    
Direct observation 
In this study, direct observation offered me the opportunity to witness 
conditions of land and resource uses in XBR. Field visits were primarily conducted 
at Xilinhot Municipality, Baiinxile Livestock Farm, and Beilike Livestock Farm to 
observe the current conditions of land and resource uses along with the events 
related to natural resource management.  
 
Finally, the results of content analysis of interview transcripts and relevant 
documents, and the information from direct observation, were integrated to assess 
resource management practices in XBR in their institutional contexts. In other 
words, the findings from different data sources cross-checked, triangulated, and 
complemented each other to explore in-depth the phenomena of interest (Teddlie 
and Tashakkori 2002).    
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2.2.3 Limitations of the research methods  
This study has limitations inherent with the research methods utilized to 
fully address the second research objective - to assess the institution of community 
participation in XBR - in so far as all respondents in the interviews were either the 
reserve staff or managers from BLF. The institution of community participation, 
therefore, was assessed based on the perspectives of the reserve staff and officials 
from BLF, while the voices of local communities were absent due to time limit for 
the research. However, the other two dimensions of data collection methods - 
document analysis and direct observation - can at least partly address these 
limitations. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEGISLATION AND ORGANIZATION OF 
PROTECTED AREAS IN CHINA 
 
This chapter addresses one of the research objectives: to assess the 
legislation, regulations, and administrative structures of the management of XBR. 
The chapter describes the legislative frameworks and administrative structures for 
reserve management through the following elements. First, Section 3.1 situates 
XBR in China’s PA system and the network of one category of PAs - nature 
reserves. Some limitations inherent in the PA scheme and the network of nature 
reserves are also illustrated to shed light on the issues facing the management of 
XBR. Second, Section 3.2 presents the legislative context for the management of 
XBR. Third, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 clarify the roles of different organizations 
responsible for reserve management, and describe organizational roles and 
dynamics of the current reserve management organization - the XBR Management 
Bureau, along with the major issues the organization is facing. Thus, the 
organization, acting as the major role in the management of XBR, is analyzed in 
terms of its organizational roles, dynamics, and issues.  
 
3.1 China’s system of protected areas 
China maintains a system of PAs different from many other nations. Rather 
than adopting the PA categories defined in the IUCN (World Conservation
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Union) system which is based on the primary management objectives of different 
categories of PAs, the Chinese system utilizes six primary categories of PAs listed 
in Table 5. Over 2000 sites have so far been designated as PAs (Ouyang 2000). 
Moreover, along with the country’s increasing participation in the global 
conservation community, China has included the category of biosphere reserves 
into its network of PAs8. In addition, China has its own Biosphere Reserve Network 
into which 93 nature reserves have been accepted, with 26 of them having been 
internationally recognized and included into the UNESCO’s biosphere reserve 
network.  
Table 5: China’s system of protected areas 
Category Description Permitted Uses 
Nature Reserves Land with representative 
natural ecosystems, rare 
plant and animal species, 
and natural monuments.  
Scientific research, 
tourism, visit, and 
ecological restoration.  
Forest Parks Forests ecosystems and 
their landscapes.  
Recreation and tourism. 
Scenic Areas Land with sightseeing, 
cultural, or scientific 
values, and with scenic 
natural and human 
landscapes.  
Recreation, tourism, and 
projects related to 
scientific research and 
cultural activities. 
Protected Forestry 
Areas for Traditional 
Culture 
Forests ecosystems with 
particular cultural 
significance.  
 
Protected Areas for 
Natural Forests 
Forests ecosystems focused 
on the ecological functions 
of forests. 
 
Biosphere Reserves* Same as Nature Reserves. Same as Nature Reserves. 
Adapted from Ouyang (2000: 27) *China’s biosphere reserves are based on the 
existing nature reserves which have been accepted into the international Man and 
the Biosphere (MAB) network or the Chinese Biosphere Reserve Network. The 
description and permitted uses of these biosphere reserves, therefore, are the same 
as those for the category of nature reserves.   
                                                        
8 Although there exist disputes concerning whether biosphere reserves should be included into the categories of 
PAs, this study is consistent with the World Conservation Union (IUCN) that views biosphere reserves as a 
category of PAs (Price 1996). 
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Such a system of PAs, however, is far from clearly defined in terms of the 
functions and properties of different kinds of PAs, as well as land uses and 
activities permitted within their boundaries (Ouyang 2000). In addition, there is no 
holistic planning and management strategy for PAs in the country. This ambiguity 
concerning the definition of PA categories, in turn, results in the dilemmas facing 
the establishment and management of these PAs on the ground.  
In practice, the boundary of one category of PAs may overlap with that in 
another category, which gives rise to land uses and management defined by one 
category of PAs contradicting those prescribed by the other. For instance, in some 
cases, within a nature reserve, a forest park or a scenic area is established. 
Compared to the nature reserve, the forest park and scenic area focus more on 
providing recreational services than on conserving natural habitats and species. 
Therefore, with the lack of well clarified schemes for the management of nature 
reserves, the recreation roles of forest parks or scenic areas are often prioritized and 
the conservation functions of nature reserves compromised (Ouyang 2000). For 
example, within the core zones of some of these nature reserves, tourist activities 
are carried out in spite of how important these areas are for biodiversity 
preservation. In addition, the existence of a forest park or a scenic area within the 
boundary of a nature reserve may also exert negative impacts on the designation of 
functional zones for the nature reserve. In some cases, the core zones of the nature 
reserve have to give way to the forest park or scenic area and, as a result, are unable 
to cover all the areas where strict protection is required and almost all forms of 
human activities should be prohibited (Ouyang 2000).  
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 China’s network of nature reserves 
Within China’s system of PAs, nature reserves are the most important 
because they comprise the largest number and occupy the largest total area of all 
protected sites in the country. Furthermore, compared to other categories of PAs, 
they also require more attention to biodiversity conservation. China’s network of 
nature reserves began with the establishment of Dinghushan Nature Reserve in 
1956. The number of nature reserves has expanded dramatically since the 1980s. It 
had increased from 34 in 1978 to 1227 in 2000, growing from 0.13% to around 
10% of the country’s land area, respectively.  
The network of nature reserves has three dimensions (Figure 5). First, it 
utilizes three categories, which include Natural Ecosystem Reserves, Wildlife 
Reserves, and Natural Monument Reserves, based on the property of certain 
species or habitats which the reserves aim to protect. Second, China’s nature 
reserves are divided into four levels - national, provincial, city, and county levels - 
according to the degree of importance of the species or habitats the reserves are 
trying to conserve (Ouyang 2000). Finally, there are several central ministries (refer 
to Figure 5) responsible for the management of nature reserves. Theoretically, any 
one of the nature reserves has a defined central ministry charged with its 
establishment and management. At the same time, any one of the nature reserves 
belongs to one of the three categories based on its habitats and species, and one of 
the four geographic levels according to its degree of significance for conservation. 
This network, however, is far from effective and efficient in practice.  
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Figure 5: China’s network of nature reserves 
One drawback of this network is the lack of cl
central ministries in establishing and managing nature
Reserve Regulation (China, State Council 1994), it is 
Environmental Protection Administration is responsib
management of all nature reserves in China, other cen
nature reserves in their own jurisdictions9. For examp
Forestry Agency had been charged with the managem
with forests ecosystems as their primary landscapes (O
                                                        
9 In this regard, XBR is de jure under the jurisdiction of the State Envir
other words, the State Environmental Protection Administration is de ju
management of XBR. 
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onmental Protection Administration. In 
re responsible for the establishment and 
concerning the establishment and management of nature reserves, the 
communication and coordination among these management departments, all of 
which are under the administration of the State Council, are very limited. Without a 
holistic planning strategy for either the establishment or management of nature 
reserves in China, these departments often establish nature reserves and other types 
of PAs within their own jurisdictions without communication with one another 
(Ouyang 2000). As a consequence, sometimes a nature reserve is at the same time 
under the jurisdiction of two or more central ministries.  
Furthermore, with the trend toward greater autonomy for regional and local 
governments in China, the management responsibilities and authority for most of 
the nature reserves are in reality decentralized to provincial or city governments 
and their line agencies. For instance, it is declared in the Nature Reserve Regulation 
that a national level nature reserve should be managed either by the relevant 
agency/agencies of the provincial government whose territory encompasses the 
reserve, or by the central ministry/ministries taking charge of the management of 
the reserve. Further, for provincial, city, and county level nature reserves, the 
regulation declares that the relevant agencies of provincial or city governments 
whose jurisdictions cover the reserves are entitled to manage these nature reserves. 
In practice, while there is a limited number of national level nature reserves under 
the direct management of the central ministries, most nature reserves are 
administrated by provincial or city governments and their agencies, with the central 
departments de jure responsible for these reserves in reality dealing little with their 
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management. Taking XBR as an example, it is the Xilingol League10 government 
and its relevant agencies that are taking charge of this national level nature reserve.  
To make this network of nature reserves effective and efficient, a holistic 
planning and management strategy is required. This strategy can help clarify the 
categories of nature reserves and can facilitate the coordination among the central 
ministries. Additionally, the holistic strategy can provide a general guidance for the 
establishment and management of nature reserves. General guidance for nature 
reserves is important for defining the characteristics of and land uses in nature 
reserves. It can, in turn, help clarify issues facing the management of these reserves. 
In addition, the improvement of the efficiency of the network of nature reserves 
depends on finding a way to improve both the function of the network and the 
management of nature reserves using relatively less capital and manpower input. In 
other words, nature reserves are conserved and managed with relatively low costs. 
And the network of nature reserves can perform its functions with relatively low 
input.  
 
3.2 Legislation and regulations  
China’s environmental legislation started with the emergence of the 
Environmental Protection Law in 1979. Since then, a series of laws and regulations 
for environmental protection and natural resource management have come into 
effect. Regarding the regulations in relation to nature reserves, China’s network of 
nature reserves is defined in the Principle for Categories and Grades of Nature 
                                                        
10 As is referred to above, a league is equal to a prefecture in terms of administrative levels. So in reality, XBR 
is under the administration of the regional government (i.e., the Xilingol League government) and its agencies 
instead of the central ministry (i.e., the State Environmental Protection Administration).  
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Reserves passed in 1993 and enacted in 1994 (China, State Environmental 
Protection Administration and State Technological Supervision Agency 1993) as 
well as the Nature Reserve Regulation. Additionally, the legislation directly related 
to nature reserves includes the Nature Reserve Regulation, a Land Management 
Rule for Nature Reserves, and a Regulation for Forest and Wildlife Reserves.  
The Land Management Rule for Nature Reserves declares that the land 
within nature reserves is state or collectively owned, and that land use permits are 
required for land users in these reserves (China, Ministry of Land and Natural 
Resources and State Environmental Protection Administration 1995). The 
Regulation for Forest and Wildlife Reserves focuses on the protection of forest 
ecosystems and rare species of plants and animals (China, State Forestry Agency 
1985). The Nature Reserve Regulation was issued by the State Council in 1994 and 
is discussed below in greater detail.  
Besides the roles of the relevant central ministries, regional governments 
and their line agencies in the management of nature reserves, which are mentioned 
in Section 3.1, the regulation also declares that in nature reserves, the functional 
areas of the core, buffer, and experimental zones can be delineated11. Typically, in 
the core areas, human interventions are strictly forbidden. Almost all forms of 
human activities are also prohibited in the buffer zones except for scientific 
research. Outside the buffer zones are experimental areas where numerous 
                                                        
11 In this regard, XBR is basically consistent with the International Biosphere Reserve Network in terms of the 
division of functional zones. As is referred to above, the functional areas in XBR include the core, buffer, 
transition, and experimental zones. Therefore, compared to the functional areas defined by the MAB world 
network (see Section 1.1), XBR also incorporates the experimental zone into its functional areas. However, the 
functions and permitted land uses of experimental zones in XBR are different from those defined for nature 
reserves in the Nature Reserve Regulation. In this regard, the experimental zone defined in the Nature Reserve 
Regulation is similar to the transition zone clarified in the MAB world network in terms of its functions and 
permitted land uses and activities. In contrast, XBR’s experimental zones are focused on field research and 
demonstration functions, and are always fenced areas in which limited forms of human activities are allowed. 
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activities for research and recreation are permitted. Based on the regulation, many 
nature reserves have been divided into the three types of functional zones. However, 
the actual land uses and activities implemented in these functional areas are 
sometimes far beyond what are defined in the regulation. For example, while in 
theory the core areas should be strictly protected, in reality tourist activities have 
been carried out in the core zones of many nature reserves in China.   
Moreover, it is declared in the regulation that for each nature reserve, the 
special management organization should be founded to take charge of the reserve’s 
day-to-day operations. The primary responsibilities of these organizations include 
providing assistance to research activities conducted by external individuals or 
groups, carrying out dissemination and education programs about the nature reserve, 
implementing environmental monitoring in the reserve, organizing tourism 
activities and other kinds of recreation programs, and designing management plans 
for the reserve, etc. In addition, the regulation also requires that reserve 
management organizations incorporate their management plans into the funding 
and budgetary plans of governments and their agencies. These organizations, the 
regulation claims, should also be responsible for the enforcement of these 
management plans. Finally, none of the abovementioned legislation refers to, let 
alone declares to justify, or requires, local participation.  
Generally speaking, in China, the laws and regulations for environmental 
and natural resource protection do not make their standards explicit. Moreover, the 
lack of a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for legislation and regulations, 
along with a low priority put on environmental protection compared to economic 
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development around the country, makes their implementation problematic on the 
ground (Environmental Policymaking in China. 1998). This is the case for the 
Nature Reserve Regulation, which, as the main legislation for nature reserve 
management in China, is more descriptive than prescriptive. In particular, the rules 
about land uses and other activities within nature reserves are not clearly specified, 
and thus the specific guidance for reserve management is absent. The lack of an 
effective legislative framework for managing nature reserves partly leads to the 
dilemmas faced by practitioners of reserve management when fulfilling their 
conservation and management roles.  
 
3.3 Organizational roles and structures 
3.3.1 Organizational changes 
The past two decades have witnessed a shift in the organizations that take 
charge of the management of XBR. An alliance emerged and was then dissolved, a 
range of government bureaucracies were involved and expelled, and the 
organization created specifically for the reserve’s management had its ups and 
downs. In general, the history of the management organizations for XBR can be 
divided into three major periods: from reserve establishment to 1994, from 1994 to 
1999, and from 1999 until present (Figure 6).  
 
 46
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Figure 6: The history of the major organizational changes in Xilingol 
Biosphere Reserve (Adapted from Han et al. 2002: 80, 82) 
From the establishment of the reserve until now, BLF12 has continued to 
play a critical role in the management of XBR. While the reserve was designated in 
1985, the independent organization specifically committed to reserve management 
did not emerge until 1994. During the period from 1985 to 1994, it was BLF that 
was responsible for implementing conservation and management activities in the 
reserve, with the Inner Mongolia Construction Bureau and the Inner Mongolia 
Animal Husbandry Bureau in charge of supervising reserve management. During 
this period, BLF also provided considerable human and financial resources for 
natural resource management in XBR.  
Between the reserve establishment and 1994, an alliance was formed 
between the reserve and BLF, with the director of the Production Division of BLF 
at the same time serving as the head of the alliance. Two full-time staff worked for 
the alliance. BLF also appointed a group of people to take charge of fencing and 
patrolling around the core areas (Han et al. 2002). Additionally, the alliance was 
responsible for the coordination and communication with people both within and 
                                                        
12 BLF is a state-owned farm where most of XBR’s core and buffer zones are situated (refer to Section 1.3 for 
greater detail). 
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outside of XBR. For example, it provided assistance for research activities 
conducted by some domestic and international scholars in the reserve. During the 
period of its existence, the alliance even added two vehicles and built a house to 
facilitate its day-to-day operations (Han et al. 2002). Apart from some financial 
support coming from governments, BLF afforded part of the funding for reserve 
management.  
Furthermore, compared to the reserve, BLF has a longer history in this area, 
given its foundation in 1950. The relatively longer presence of BLF in the region, 
in part, laid the groundwork for its predominant presence and important role in 
managing the reserve. Moreover, as is referred to above, most of the core and 
buffer zones of XBR are situated within the jurisdiction of BLF. BLF, therefore, is 
an important stakeholder in XBR and thus should be involved in reserve 
management. The alliance existing from 1985 to 1994 established a collaborative 
relationship between BLF and the reserve. Unfortunately, it was disbanded in 1994 
when a new organization, the XBR Management Division, emerged. The 
dissolution of the alliance was accompanied by the end of the positive relationships 
between BLF and the reserve, which had existed for about a decade; it also partly 
laid the foundation for the conflicts between the two entities.    
In early 1994, to establish a management organization specifically 
responsible for the management of XBR, the XBR Management Division was 
founded under the decree of the Xilingol League government. It served as a public 
enterprise (shiye danwei). At this time, it was the Xilingol League Environmental 
Protection Bureau of the Urban and Rural Construction that acted as the main 
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government agency for the management of XBR; it took the watchdog role over the 
performance of the Management Division to ensure that the reserve was under 
appropriate management and conservation. Compared to the alliance, the 
Management Division was a more independent organization in that it consisted of 
eight full-time staff members and had financial autonomy. Hence, instead of 
significantly depending on BLF for reserve management, the management 
responsibilities for XBR were mostly transferred to a special organization - the 
Management Division.  
Nonetheless, the establishment of an independent organization specifically 
responsible for reserve management was not accompanied by the provision of a 
secure funding channel to support the Management Division’s conservation and 
management activities. When the Management Division was initially set up, it was 
declared that the organization would receive the funding of RMB 15,000 yuan per 
year from the Xilingol League government (Han et al. 2002). Nevertheless, these 
annual funds, which for the Management Division meant a form of steady financial 
support, were never put in practice, although the organization received some 
funding from the Xilingol League government and its agencies on an occasional 
basis (Han et al. 2002). As a result, the organization was basically self-reliant and 
self-developed, much like the operation of a profit-seeking enterprise.  
After that, in 1999, organizational changes occurred again. Under the 
directive from the Xilingol League government, the Management Division was 
replaced by the XBR Management Bureau (MB). The XBR Management Bureau 
will henceforth be referred to as the MB. Since in China, “bureau” represents a 
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higher bureaucratic rank than “division,” this organizational change may have 
corresponded to the upgrade of the Xilingol Nature Reserve from the provincial 
level to the national level in 1997. Apart from its new name, the organization has 
also experienced a transformation in its organizational roles and structures.  
 
3.3.2 Organizational roles and structures of the Management Bureau 
The current MB is still in transition, struggling to build up organizational 
structures, skills, human and financial resources, and collaborative relationships 
with other groups necessary to make a commitment to manage the reserve. The 
organizational responsibilities for the MB are specified in the Nature Reserve 
Regulation and the Regulation on Xilingol National Grassland Nature Reserve 
(Inner Mongolia, the National People’s Congress 2001). The latter will henceforth 
be referred to as the XBR Regulation. According to these two regulations, the 
primary roles for the MB include: 
● Design the management plans for conservation and management of 
XBR;  
● Incorporate the management plans into the funding plans of 
governments and their agencies, and implement the management plans; 
● Maintain and improve the conservation facilities and infrastructures in 
the reserve;  
● Implement ecological monitoring in the reserve;  
● Conserve natural resources and natural ecosystems within the reserve;  
● Coordinate or organize scientific research conducted by other 
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organizations in the reserve;  
● Carry out education programs and disseminate information about the 
reserve;  
● Organize visiting and tourism activities having no negative impacts on 
the natural environment within the reserve.  
Today, the Xilingol League Environmental Protection Bureau takes the role 
of direct leader of the MB. It thus becomes the most important government agency 
directly responsible for managing XBR. Such a “watchdog role” of XBR is 
attractive for some government agencies because of the potential benefits the 
reserve may bring to them. More specifically, the Xilingol League Forestry Bureau 
and Environmental Protection Bureau have strived for the watchdog role over the 
XBR. Primary responsibilities for reserve administration were transferred in 2002 
to the Forestry Bureau from the Environmental Protection Bureau. In 2004, the 
Environmental Protection Bureau again gained the watchdog role on reserve 
administration. From respondents’ perspectives, XBR can serve as an instrument 
for these agencies to apply for funding from central and regional authorities, and it 
thus becomes the “focus” of these agencies. 
Moreover, the MB now encompasses 19 full-time staff distributed in six 
units (Table 6). Except for the research and monitoring station, all other units are 
located in Xilinhot Municipality. Instead of being elected democratically, the 
director of the MB was appointed by the “upper level,” just as most of the 
administrative departments (xingzheng jiguan) or public enterprises (shiye danwei) 
in China. Moreover, the MB consists of four “formal” personnel who were assigned 
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to the organization after graduating from colleges and whose salaries are provided 
by the payroll of the Xilingol League government.  
Table 6: Organizational structure of the Management Bureau 
Unit Administration 
and Logistic 
Office 
Resource 
Management 
Office 
Dissemination 
and Education 
Office 
Accountant 
Office 
Police 
Station 
Research 
and 
Monitoring 
Station 
Staff 
Number 
4 
（Including 
the Director of  
the MB） 
2 2 2 4 5 
Apart from the four “formal” staff, all other members of the MB serve as 
daily employees. These members do not have a higher education. Yet training 
opportunities are scarce in the organization partly because of the MB’s limited 
access to manpower training resources. More specifically, XBR is located in a 
relatively impoverished and remote region where the geographical isolation makes 
information and other important resources difficult to attain. While in some 
reserves in China, international or domestic NGOs play a critical role in providing 
technical training, information, and other support to reserve practitioners, no NGOs 
have been thus far active in XBR. Further, the organizational property of the MB 
also gives rise to its lack of training opportunities. As a government-established 
public enterprise (shiye danwei), the motivations within the reserve staff for 
improving their technical skills are relatively limited in comparison with many 
civic initiated environmental NGOs in China which are typically active in seeking 
resources for capacity building. 
 
3.4 A basic organizational issue - Lack of funding 
 52
3.4.1 Financial sources of the Management Bureau 
Just as most nature reserves in China, XBR also suffers from the problem of 
insecure and insufficient funding. Most of nature reserves in China are funded from 
the central and local budgets, with a small number of reserves at the same time 
receiving part of their funds from multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, or 
international environmental NGOs (Xu 2000). On the other hand, many demands 
are made on these central and local funds, whereas nature reserves are seldom seen 
as an equal priority with many other sectors. When in most cases in China, more 
attention is focused on economic development than on environmental protection, 
for nature reserves “the link with economic development is seen as too remote, (and) 
the diversion of other program funds is seen as too expensive in the short term” 
(McNeely 1995: 4). The reserves, therefore, are achieving declining shares of the 
national and local fiscal resources. In addition, the dramatic growth in the number 
of China’s nature reserves since the 1980s makes such circumstances even worse. 
Furthermore, governments from central to local levels have no formal 
budgetary channel for nature reserves. With the trend of fiscal decentralization with 
regard to China’s environmental protection programs, local governments have to 
take on the growing fiscal burden for nature reserves (Harkness 1998). While the 
central ministries provide part of funding for a small number of national level 
nature reserves, most of the reserves have to rely on financial support from regional 
and local governments. Not surprisingly, the funding from these regional and local 
governments is often far short of the money required to meet the basic management 
needs in these reserves. The reserve officials, therefore, have to limit their attention 
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and activities based on the availability of financial support. For example, reserve 
managers may sometimes focus their limited funds on patrolling the reserve, while 
other important roles such as environmental monitoring and coordination with local 
communities have to be put in suspension.  
This financial dilemma is even worse in XBR partly because the reserve is 
situated in a relatively poor region of the country13. Table 7 shows the financial 
assistance XBR had received from regional and local governments during the 16 
years between 1985 and 2001. Compared to the input from the reserve’s own 
income-generating activities which accounts for some 34% of total input, the 
money from regional and local governments accounts for a larger percent (about 
66%) of XBR’s total input. Han et al. (2002) pointed out that between 1985 and 
2001, the annual input per square kilometer in XBR, which is RMB 19.7 yuan or 
US$ 2.46, is about one-twentieth of the average annual input per square kilometer 
for all nature reserves in China, or one-fortieth of the average annual input per 
square kilometer for all national level nature reserves. Additionally, XBR has not 
received any financial support from either international organizations or domestic 
NGOs.  
 
 
 
                                                        
13 According to Xu (2000), the total amount of government funding for a nature reserve in China partly depends 
on the region where the reserve is located; reserves situated in economically developed provinces or cities tend 
to be better funded than their counterparts in relatively poor regions. This is understandable because most of the 
government funding for nature reserves comes from local governments at provincial, city, to county levels. 
“Richer governments” are more capable of providing financial support to conversation activities in their 
territories than the “poorer ones”. 
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Table 7: Input of Xilingol Biosphere Reserve from 1985 to 2001  
(Unit: RMB 10,000 yuan) 
Funding 
Sources 
Infrastructure 
construction 
Staff 
salaries
Core area 
maintenance
Research 
and 
monitoring 
Other 
operational 
fees 
Non- 
management 
expenses 
Total 
Government 
funding  
110 15 40 10 31 20 226.00
Reserve’s 
income- 
generating 
activities  
 62.6 51.26  9  113.86
Total 110 77.6 91.26 10 40 20 339.86
 Source: Han et al. 2002: 75. 
As illustrated in Table 7, other than government funding, the MB also relies 
on its own profit-generating activities to meet its basic operating costs. To 
understand the motivations and approaches for the reserve staff of XBR to engage 
themselves in income-generating activities, it is important to have a basic 
appreciation of the circumstances of nature reserves around the country. Almost all 
reserve administrations in China have to at least in part financially support 
themselves to bridge the gap between the funding provided by governments and the 
operational costs of these organizations. Without regular funds from governments, 
reserve managers are urged by central authorities to make the reserves 
self-supporting by diversifying their funding sources, most often by exploiting the 
natural resources within these reserves while not compromising the reserves’ 
conservation functions (Harkness 1998). However, there exist no well-defined 
guidelines for these reserve administrations concerning what commercial activities 
are permitted, what resources might be used, and to what extent might these 
resources be exploited, if the conservation functions of the reserves are to be 
prioritized (Han 2000; Harkness 1998).  
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Under such circumstances, the reserve staff often place more efforts on 
exploiting than conserving natural resources within the reserves, in spite of their 
primary conservation responsibilities. In this regard, the most significant source of 
self-generated income for nature reserves is tourism development, which has taken 
place in most reserves. Additionally, as reserve management administrations are 
vested with the rights to authorize who can operate tourist services in the reserves, 
outside practitioners are often excluded from the tourist business which, in turn, 
may be under the monopoly of reserve authorities (Li and Han 2001). In sum, 
almost all reserve administrations have participated to some degree in tourism 
development in nature reserves in China.  
Furthermore, the direct involvement of reserve authorities in tourism 
operations within nature reserves has certain negative effects on reserve 
management. This is understandable given the fact that tourist activities, once 
poorly managed, often threaten the natural environment, and that the primary role 
of reserve authorities - ecological conservation - can be weakened by their direct 
engagement in tourist services. More specifically, as it is the reserve management 
administration that decides what tourism activities are implemented in the reserve, 
and it is the same organization that carries out these activities, it tends to 
over-exploit the resources in the reserve, while an effective regime is absent to 
restrict the organization to reasonable use of the resources (Li 2000). In addition, 
the monopoly of reserve administrations in tourism markets within nature reserves 
may also lead to opposition against reserve managers from other groups who want 
to share benefits through involvement in tourism operations in the reserves (Li and 
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Han 2001).  
In these circumstances, the MB of XBR also struggles to meet its financial 
needs by undertaking income-generating activities, a large part of which are related 
to tourist services. However, tourism is not very profitable for this area, when 
compared to many other reserves especially those situated in south China. This is 
because compared to many other reserves, the scenic beauty in XBR is not so 
attractive to, and thus it is not a popular destination for, both domestic and 
international tourists.  
Since its establishment, the MB has mainly self-operated a demonstration 
pasture, the Daziran Hotel (where the MB sets up its offices on the top floor and 
uses other three floors as the hotel), a restaurant, and an ecotourism service center. 
However, except the ecotourism service center, these businesses have all ended in 
failure because of ineffective management (Han et al. 2002). Now the Daziran 
Hotel and the restaurant have been contracted to outsiders, for which the MB can 
get some money each year in return for renting out these tourist facilities. The 
demonstration pasture has disappeared along with the withdrawal of the pasture’s 
land rights.  
The ecotourism service center was founded in 1993. It is located at the bank 
of Zakstai Lake, an important sight-seeing location in XBR. Within the center, the 
MB has set up several guesthouses, an interpretive room, a research and monitoring 
station (one of the six units of the MB), and other tourist facilities. The interpretive 
room acts as the major site for education and dissemination of information about 
the biosphere reserve and biodiversity conservation in XBR. It also demonstrates or 
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provides posters, photos, and brochures about XBR, as well as samples of plants 
and animals found in the reserve, to tourists and visitors. The five members from 
the MB’s research and monitoring station are currently responsible for the 
operation of the ecotourism service center, with the income from tourist reception 
covering a part of the MB’s operating costs. 
 
3.4.2 The consequences of the lack of funding on the Management Bureau 
Five out of nine respondents from the MB agreed that inadequate funding is 
one of the major challenges for the MB. One respondent claimed:   
Anyway, our reserve (the Management Bureau) has been 
assiduously engaged in our work in recent years. A set of 
facilities has been built…The core areas have been fenced. The 
roads and parking lots have been maintained…The major issue 
we face is the lack of funding. The country requires us to 
implement conservation [activities] but does not provide large 
financial input…The country just calls on conservation without 
providing funding. Nothing can be done without money. (A 
member from the MB) 
In general, respondents identified several consequences of lack of funding 
on XBR and the MB, which are illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
1. Poor working conditions 
Figure 7: Consequences of the lack of funding on the Management Bureau 
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5. Lack of community participation 
in reserve management 
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Firstly, the working conditions for the reserve staff are very poor. The 
currently available facilities, which primarily include a computer, a fax machine, 
and a vehicle (State Forestry Agency et al. 2003), are insufficient for the MB to 
perform its organizational functions. The organization still has no Internet access, 
which proves to be one of the main barriers for the organization to gain access to 
information and other important external resources. In its most updated 
Management Plan (State Forestry Agency et al. 2003), the MB attempted to add 
more office facilities to its budget. At this point, the MB cooperated with the 
Xilingol League Forestry Bureau and the Xilingol League Environmental 
Protection Bureau, as well as the State Forestry Agency to design this 2003 
Management Plan for XBR. According to the plan, the total funds required are 
RMB 73,200,000 yuan (State Forestry Agency et al. 2003). This is a remarkable 
figure, given the fact that the government funding during the recent 16 years totals 
only RMB 2,260,000 yuan (refer to Table 7). The MB and the relevant government 
agencies are currently awaiting agreement on the plan from “upper level” 
governments or agencies. Some respondents from the MB expressed an expectation 
of a large amount of funding that is associated with the approval of the 
Management Plan.  
Secondly, insufficient funding also gives rise to a contradiction: the MB, as 
the organization responsible for conservation in XBR, financially supports itself 
using the same natural resources which it is obliged to protect. Such contradiction 
exerts great impacts on biodiversity preservation. More specifically, lack of funding 
makes the reserve staff engage in the efforts of procuring funding from 
 59
governments or the direct involvement in money-making operations. As a 
consequence, the conservation functions of the MB are often compromised. For 
example, one of the primary roles of the director of the MB is fundraising which 
has cost him a large amount of time and energy. Using one respondent’s words: “He 
(the director of the MB) is very busy. As the only leader of our bureau, he is often 
engaged in applying for projects from the ‘upper levels’” (A member from the MB). 
In addition, the MB’s direct involvement in profit-generating activities has also 
made worse the already scarce human resources for conservation actions. Further, 
as the management plan is one of the main ways by which to apply for government 
funding for XBR, some reserve staff have made great efforts to design management 
plans rather than to implement conservation programs. When the plan is not 
approved by governments or their agencies, its enforcement becomes a future 
action. However, conservation and management of XBR remain the MB’s 
responsibilities and day-to-day conservation activities its major roles.  
Thirdly, the conservation activities of the MB have been focused on fencing, 
patrolling, and maintaining the core areas, as well as a small number of education 
and dissemination programs in XBR, while many other responsibilities of the MB 
such as coordinating with local communities are seldom implemented. According 
to interviewees, projects that the MB has initiated in XBR are very scarce. A 
respondent claimed, “The projects are too limited” (A member from the MB). More 
specifically, according to respondents, these projects mainly include the 
maintenance of facilities in the reserve, fencing and patrolling around the core 
zones, the distribution of pamphlets on XBR and biodiversity conservation, and 
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visiting local inhabitants. Respondents from the MB regarded lack of funding as the 
principle barrier for them to conduct conservation activities. During the interviews, 
respondents often complained of different kinds of difficulties in their work caused 
by inadequate funding. As one interviewee said, “The projects implemented [by the 
MB] are extremely scarce because of the currently limited funding. Whatever 
activities we want to carry out we have to get financial support first” (A member 
from the MB). At this point, I regard lack of funding sources, at least to some 
extent, as the excuse of the reserve management members for their not so 
remarkable conservation performance in XBR, which is illustrated by the limited 
number and limited scope of the projects which the MB has implemented and the 
not so favorable conservation outcomes in the reserve.    
Fourthly, all members from the MB are either employed by the organization, 
or assigned to the MB through the system of job allocation in China. In addition, no 
volunteers have so far been involved in the organization. As a consequence, unlike 
many park managers in some other countries who engage in conservation activities 
based on a personal commitment to ecological protection (Harkness 1998), few of 
the staff in the MB have such personal motivations for conservation. The poor 
working conditions and the poor salary make working for the MB an unattractive 
opportunity. This is particularly the case for the five members from the MB’s 
research and monitoring station. As is referred to above, the station is located at the 
MB’s ecotourism service center, which is 52 km from Xilinhot Municipality. The 
families of the five staff from the research and monitoring station live in the 
municipality. In winter, the five people take turns working at the station for 10 days 
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and then staying at home for 20 days a month. And at other times during the year, 
they go to the municipality to have a together with their families once half a month. 
Moreover, the living conditions in the research and monitoring station are quite 
hard. For example, the five people have to go to the municipality to get food and 
other living necessities. The station has only one room, where all furniture includes 
a table and several beds, for them to live. Life is even harder in winter days as 
heating conditions are not so good. In sum, as working for the MB is not viewed by 
some of the reserve staff as a promising job opportunity, they often choose to 
change jobs. For instance, from what I have learned, two previous staff from the 
MB have jumped to the Xilingol League Environmental Protection Bureau; for 
them this means a job promotion and thus a more promising future for their careers 
and lives. 
Finally, from the perspectives of interviewees, lack of funding in part leads 
to the limited participation of local communities in reserve conservation and 
management. Some respondents perceived that if they had more money, they could 
help improve the living standard of local people through approaches such as 
ecological migration14. Further, they suggested that local residents are willing to 
participate in conservation activities only when their living or economic plights are 
resolved:  
If possible, the living standard of local residents should be 
promoted. If their standard of living is poor, for example, if their 
food is scarce and their livelihood issues are still unresolved, for 
them conservation is nothing. As the result, their participation is 
very limited. When their livelihood is improved, their 
                                                        
14 “Ecological migration” is a program initiated by the Xilingol League government. The program is aimed at 
resettling residents around the core areas of nature reserves in order to improve the conservation of these areas. 
There exist converse viewpoints among respondents about whether the resettlement program can improve the 
living standards of local communities. The program is described in greater detail in Section 4.3.2. 
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enthusiasm to participate in environmental or ecological 
protection will increase. (A member from the MB) 
These comments on the relationships between the degree of abundance of 
funding and local participation are at least partly true. For locals, only when the 
reserve management activities can provide them some benefits are they willing to 
participate in such programs or activities. This is particularly the case when local 
people have a low standard of living. Adequate funding for XBR, in turn, can bring 
about more opportunities to benefit locals, with conservation objectives 
simultaneously being met.  
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CHAPTER 4: LAND USE ISSUES AND PEOPLE-PARK CONFLICTS 
 
It is impossible to separate land rights and resource use in XBR from the 
context of land tenure regimes and the current rangeland conditions in China. The 
economic reforms initiated by the central government in the late 1970s gave rise to 
overstocking and then increasing degradation in China’s grassland regions (Ho 
2000). XBR, as with other parts of the country’s rangelands, is subject to these 
threats. On the other hand, XBR has unique resource management practices and 
land rights regimes among China’s grassland areas in so far as it serves as a 
reserve.   
This chapter aims at addressing one of the research objectives - to assess the 
responsibilities associated with land and resource rights - through the examination 
of resource use and land rights in XBR in the context of land and resource rights as 
well as the rangeland conditions in the whole country. The chapter includes the 
following sections: Section 4.1 describes the nature of grassland degradation in 
China and particularly in XBR, as well as its potential resolutions; Section 4.2 
presents land and resource rights in XBR in the Chinese context of pastoral land 
tenure. Finally, land use conflicts between major actors in XBR are examined in 
Section 4.3, followed by the recommendations of potential resolutions to 
people-park conflicts in XBR in Section 4.4.   
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4.1 Grassland degradation 
The grasslands in the north and northwest of China are confronted with the 
crisis of accelerating degradation. It is reported that about 90% of the country’s 
grasslands15 have been degraded to some degree (State Environmental Protection 
Administration 1998). While it is widely appreciated that the deterioration of 
grasslands cannot be assigned to a single factor and the reasons are multifaceted, 
policymakers and researchers are in basic unanimity that the declining rangeland 
health has occurred primarily due to overgrazing. Further, the economic reforms 
initiated in the late 1970s, and the Household Responsibility System which 
accompanied the initial reforms, are viewed as the key causes for overstocking in 
the country’s pastoral regions.  
The economic reforms were introduced by the Chinese government in the 
late 1970s. The reforms brought about a major shift toward a market-oriented 
economy and away from the centrally planned economy prevalent during the 
Maoist era (between 1949 and 1978). For pastoral sectors, the reform policy 
implied a liberalized marketing system for livestock products. In addition, the 
economic booms occurring after the reforms gave rise to an ever-growing domestic 
market and thus for pastoral sectors an increasing national demand for livestock 
products. Therefore, along with the substantial expansion of commercial livestock 
production, overgrazing increased after the economic reforms. The overexpansion 
of the livestock industry, in turn, gave rise to grassland degradation.  
To resolve or alleviate the crisis threatening China’s rangelands, both 
                                                        
15 The total area of grasslands in China accounts for about 40% of its territory (State Environmental Protection 
Administration 1998). 
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experts and officials in the country viewed reducing the number of livestock, 
among many other means, as a logical step toward decelerating or preventing 
grassland degradation. This is echoed in the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Prevention and Treatment of Desertification (China, the National People’s 
Congress 2001), a law taking effect in 2001 to control the worsening desertification 
in the country, in which it is declared:  
All levels of governments in grassland areas should take 
measures to prevent the degradation and desertification of 
grasslands in their jurisdictions by, among other approaches, 
controlling the number of livestock. 
In response to the policies of controlling livestock numbers, two types of 
programs have been initiated by governments in grassland regions. The first set of 
programs aims to directly reduce the livestock population, sometimes by requiring 
herders to slaughter a potion of their herds based on the grasslands’ carrying 
capacity. Such approaches, however, are difficult to implement given the evidence 
that herders are unwilling to reduce their herds which serve as both the major 
source of their livelihood and the primary indicator of their economic status (U.S. 
Embassy Beijing Environment, Science, Technology & Health Section 2001). 
Another set of programs is related to the indirect reduction of animal numbers - to 
reduce the number of people who are dependent upon animal husbandry for a living. 
These programs or activities correspond with the policy of “environmental 
migration of people” initiated by the Chinese government, in which people living in 
the regions with fragile ecological conditions are called on to be resettled to other 
places in order to alleviate the pressures on, and thus to regenerate, natural 
resources within these regions. The success of these programs depends, in good 
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part, upon the provision of alternative employment and livelihood to people who 
are reallocated.   
Under such circumstances, the grasslands in XBR are also in a degraded 
condition. Han et al. (2002) pointed out that by 1999, over 80% of the grasslands in 
the reserve had been degraded to some degree, and that moderately and seriously 
degraded grasslands in 1999 had respectively increased 38% and 47% since 1985 
when the reserve was established. This can be illustrated by a respondent’s 
comments: 
When I came to this farm in 1987, herders were able to cut and 
attain grass within the circumference of 2.5 km. Hence, for a 
household which raised 30 to 40 sheep, it was able to get enough 
grass without the need to climb the hillsides. But now they have 
to buy grass from places 4 km or 5 km away…I have lived in 
this region for 17 years. During these 17 years, the number of 
households in this region has decreased from about 20 or 30 to 
some 10. Now, herders have to graze their animals as they 
cannot attain [enough] grass by cutting grass nearby. (A 
manager from BLF) 
Recently, the conditions continue to get worse. Similar to other grassland 
regions in China, the growing population and expanding herd production have 
mainly resulted in the declining conditions of rangelands in XBR. The most serious 
grassland degradation in the reserve has taken place during the recent 50 years. In 
the case of BLF, it is reported that the farm’s population in 2000 was 510 times of 
that in 1950 when BLF was founded, and that the number of livestock increased 
about 240 times during the same period (Han et al. 2002). Not surprisingly, 
widespread grassland degradation in the reserve has threatened the livelihood of 
local resource dependent communities as livestock farming provides them the 
principle source of income.  
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On the other hand, the establishment of XBR has not decelerated, let alone 
impeded, the process of grassland degradation which had taken place prior to the 
reserve designation. Although respondents perceived the reserve’s foundation as 
bringing positive impacts in the form of landscape change, they often referred to 
the core areas which are being fenced. For instance, in the interviews, the most 
frequently mentioned favorable effect of XBR’s establishment on the reserve’s 
landscape was vegetation regeneration in the core areas. In reality, from the 
perspective of the whole landscape, the reserve has not experienced real favorable 
changes. A respondent said:  
We cannot say that the landscape has been getting better after 
the reserve was established. But the reserve can at least play a 
role in maintaining the original conditions of landscapes…The 
trend of the conditions of all the grasslands, whether in the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region or in the Xilingol League, is… 
toward worsening. It is impossible that the grasslands [in XBR] 
are getting better than before. (A member from the MB)  
In sum, the conservation outcomes of XBR are not so favorable. The 
existence of the reserve only has improved the ecological conditions of the five 
fenced core areas, which are situated in the reserve as five isolated islands. The 
establishment of the reserve has almost no impacts, either positive or negative, on 
the remaining landscape of the reserve. This is quite understandable given the 
current ecological context of all the grassland regions in China. On the other hand, 
the not-so-favorable conservation outcomes from the perspective of the whole 
reserve’s landscape are also related to the fact that the reserve staff have 
over-focused on the management of the core, buffer, and experimental zones, which 
encompass a very limited area in XBR.        
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4.2 Land and resource tenure 
The land tenure system for China’s rangelands has received much attention 
from policy makers and researchers who are concerned with rangeland degradation. 
The uncertainty with regard to rangeland use rights contracts and the current 
rangeland tenure is viewed as the primary cause for overgrazing. This section 
situates the land and resource rights of XBR within the rangeland rights context, 
with reference to literature such as Banks (2001), Banks (2003), and Ho (2000) on 
land tenure in pastoral sectors in China.  
Land tenure in China, especially the Household Responsibility System, is 
quite a complicated issue to explore. This is particularly the case for pastoral areas 
because: (1) the relevant literature is scarce, especially compared to that on land 
tenure in China’s agricultural sectors; (2) there exist great inconsistencies between 
what the official documents or officials state and the de facto circumstances 
concerning rangeland rights, which results in, at least partly, distorted information 
from document analysis and what some respondents said. To address these 
difficulties, I examined land and resource rights in XBR within the context of 
rangeland rights in China through the reference of Banks (2001, 2003) and Ho 
(2000)’s work. While a large part of research on China’s land tenure is focused on 
the country’s agricultural sectors, Banks and Ho focused their research on 
rangeland rights in Xinjiang-Uygur and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regions 
respectively. Unfortunately, no researchers have thus far paid particular attention to 
rangeland rights in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Although an in-depth 
exploration of land tenure in Inner Mongolia is needed to contribute to the literature, 
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it is far beyond the scope and resources of this research.  
In such circumstances, this section presents what the relevant literature 
states about rangeland tenure in China, and what can be learned about land and 
resource rights in XBR through document analysis and interviews. In addition, this 
section provides a description of land rights status in XBR in a most general sense 
and from the perspective of the whole reserve, rather than a detailed exploration of 
rangeland rights based on different regions within the reserve.   
The Household Responsibility System (hereafter also referred to as the 
contract responsibility system, the household contract system or the contract system) 
was an innovative form of land tenure initiated in the late 1970s in China’s 
agricultural sectors. After that, it was introduced in pastoral areas in the 1980s to 
replace the commune system under which the rangeland ownership was invested in 
the production team (the administrative unit below the commune16) (Ho 2000). 
Based on the new land tenure regime, the individual rancher family became the 
basic unit of production, with rangeland use rights being vested in the households. 
In other words, the rancher households were authorized to contract a patch of land 
and were allocated some previously communal livestock on the basis of their 
household size and labor force (Banks 2001). In most of the current cases, herders 
have been able to lease the use rights to rangelands for a period of thirty years, 
whereas the contract period, which has been subject to changes several times, was 
once as short as five years (Ho 2000). Such land use rights are inheritable and 
alienable but not saleable.  
                                                        
16 Under the land reform policy introduced in the late 1950s, the commune and the production team, which are 
respectively equal to the current township and natural village in terms of administrative levels, were established. 
The commune regimes persisted during the Maoist period (between 1949 and1978) and were substituted by the 
Household Responsibility System in the 1980s in China’s pastoral regions. 
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Under the pasture contract system, the income of ranchers was directly 
related to their total amount of products and their working efficiency, since they 
were entitled to keep the residual earning after they had met the production quotas 
and performed tax duties (Banks 2003). In contrast with people living under the 
commune system, the production incentives of herders under the contract system 
had been greatly enhanced and as a consequence, their production and income have 
rapidly increased since the 1980s (Banks 2003). The new property regime brought 
about much more freedom to herders in terms of land and natural resource 
management than people who had lived under the commune system. However, 
facing a wide range of opportunities and potentials for improving their standard of 
living, herders continuously expanded their livestock herds, which in turn exerted 
more and more pressure on grasslands in the long term. 
The country’s rangeland ownership and use rights are defined in the 
Rangeland Law (China, the National People’s Congress 1985) passed in 1985. It 
“represents the official incorporation of the pasture contract system into law” (Ho 
2000: 389). The law declares state or collective ownership of grasslands in China. 
In addition, it states that households and collectives are authorized to contract the 
use rights to grasslands to undertake animal husbandry, among other industries. Yet 
the contract period is not defined in the law. Moreover, as far as the rangeland 
ownership is concerned, it is ambiguous in defining the meanings of “collective” in 
the Rangeland Law, along with the 1982 Constitution17 (China, the National 
People’s Congress 1982); in the legislation, the term “collective” encompasses 
                                                        
17 In the 1982 Constitution, it is declared that the land in the country are state or collectively owned, but the 
definition of the term “collective” is not clarified. 
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three levels of administrative units: the township, administrative village, and 
natural village18 (Ho 2000). In reality, the collective ownership of rangelands can 
be vested in any of the three administrative units.  
This can be illustrated by the case of XBR. Grasslands in the reserve are 
either state or collectively owned. More specifically, in the four livestock farms, the 
land is state owned; apart from the livestock farms and Xilinhot Municipality, 
rangelands are basically collectively owned with the land ownership vested in the 
townships or villages. The autonomous region’s de jure pastoral tenure is defined in 
the Regulation on Grassland Management in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
(Inner Mongolia, the National People’s Congress 1984 and 1991) passed in 1984 
and amended in 1991. In the regulation, it is stated that the rangelands and 
hayfields are owned by the state or the collective. Grassland ownership permits are 
issued to the collectives owning the land, while the units which are entitled with 
use rights to state owned grasslands are issued grassland use permits. In addition, 
grassland ownership and use rights are confirmed by these permits issued by league 
governments in Inner Mongolia. For example, BLF has been granted the use 
permits of grasslands under its jurisdiction, while the management organizations of 
XBR have struggled for a long time to gain the use rights and grassland use permits 
to the reserve’s core areas from the hand of BLF (see Section 4.3.1 for greater 
detail). Moreover, the regulation also declares, in a somewhat vague way, that the 
units vested with grassland ownership should contract the grasslands to individual 
households or groups to use for a long term, and that the contract system is thus put 
                                                        
18 The major administrative levels in China include the central level, province, city, county, township, 
administrative village, and natural village. 
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into effect, which incorporates the protection, use, management, and improvement 
of grasslands.  
Furthermore, theoretically, the pasture contract system focuses on the 
individual use rights and using rangelands within their carrying capacity. Yet there 
exist great gaps or contradictions between the de jure pasture contract regimes and 
their practical implementation. First, the establishment of the household contract 
should be accompanied by the assignment of carrying capacities to the household 
pastures and the creation of sanctions to impede overstocking. An external agency, 
which is often the local Animal Husbandry Bureau, along with its associated range 
police forces, should be responsible for monitoring and enforcing the stocking rate 
of the pastures. However, in practice, such forms of carrying capacities have never 
been monitored or enforced either by the Animal Husbandry Bureaus or by pastoral 
groups and communities (Banks 2003). 
Additionally, it is officially claimed that the household contract system has 
been in place in most of China’s pastoral areas; for instance, according to the Inner 
Mongolia Animal Husbandry Bureau, use rights to about 79% of the total usable 
rangelands in Inner Mongolia had been contracted to individual households by 
1990 (Banks 2001). In practice, however, these official claims are by no means 
unquestionable. In most cases, contracting rangeland use rights to households was 
not accompanied by specifying the location or boundary of the plots of pastures 
leased to households (see Banks 2001, Ho 2000 for examples). In other words, the 
de facto contract system has not been implemented in many pastoral regions even 
two decades after the contract system was introduced.  
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This is supported by the case of BLF. It was not until 2003 that use rights to 
grasslands in BLF had been, in reality, contracted to individual households19. This 
can be illustrated by a respondent’s comments:  
The most significant decisions that the farm made last year are 
contracting and allocating pastures to individuals and the real 
implementation of the central policies of “two rights and one 
system” (shuangquan yizhi) which include the management and 
use rights (to grasslands), as well as the contract responsibility 
system. (A manager from BLF) 
Since 2003, ranchers in BLF have been entitled with the rights to use and 
manage the pastures contracted to them. In addition, the plot of the pasture for each 
household has been clearly defined in terms of its area and location. For example, a 
staff member of BLF was authorized to lease a pasture with a total area of some 33 
hectares (ha), with each of their family members entitled to contract a pasture of 
about 13 ha in area (Interviews). The contract period is 30 years. Through field 
observation, some households in BLF have had their leased pastures fenced.  
Regarding the implementation of the contract system in the whole reserve, 
Han et al. (2002: 73) adopted part of a 1996 official document from the Xilingol 
League government, which refers to the pasture contract in Xilingol League and is 
summarized as the following. In 1989, local governments or their grassland 
management agencies - the Animal Husbandry Bureaus - in Xilingol League began 
to collect rangeland management fees from local ranchers based on the number of 
their household livestock. In addition, stocking rates were meanwhile defined and 
herders whose animal numbers exceeded the specified stocking rates were required 
to pay monetary penalties. Afterwards the contract system was introduced in 
                                                        
19 It is consistent among several respondents that in BLF, pastures were in reality contracted to rancher 
households in 2003 and that the implementation of the pasture contract system started in 2003. 
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Xilingol League. This system included the use right contracts for two types of land 
- pastures and hayfields. Households were entitled to contract hayfields. Production 
quotas were set for these hayfields and people who were unable to meet the quotas 
were imposed monetary penalties. The hay or trees growing in the contracted 
hayfields were owned, in the long term, by those who cultivated them, and they 
were saleable and inheritable. At the same time, ranchers were authorized to 
contract pastures. Before being contracted out to households or groups, the pastures 
were delimited and evaluated, and their production capacity and stocking rate were 
defined. Different grassland compensation fees were charged to ranchers according 
to the degree of overgrazing on their leased pastures. Additionally, the contract was 
legally notarized and grassland use permits were, at the same time, issued to those 
who leased pastures (Han et al. 2002). 
To sum up, the above summarized document provides a basic description of 
the de jure contract system introduced in Xilingol League where XBR is situated. 
Nonetheless, the practical implementation of such a contract system may fall short 
of what the official documents describe, just as what Longworth and Williamson 
stated as cited in Ho (2000): “At central government level certain policies are in 
place and provincial, prefectural, county and even township officials will describe 
(…) how the policy is working. However, at the village and household level, the 
policy does not exist” (390).  
When being asked about the land use rights in BLF or XBR, some 
interviewees referred to the pasture contract system, that the contract period were 
20 years previously and is currently 30 years, and that the pastures were contracted 
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to local ranchers in 1978. At this time, their voices represent the official language 
about land tenure in China, just as what Longworth and Williamson indicated20. 
Nonetheless, in reality, the use rights to rangelands had mostly rested with 
townships or villages. In many areas in XBR, the rangelands had not been 
contracted to individual rancher households until the most recent years, just as had 
occurred in BLF.  
Furthermore, the uncertainty with respect to the pasture contract, which 
includes the lack of defined locations or boundaries for the contracted pastures as 
well as the absence of monitoring and enforcement of the carrying capacity for 
these pastures, gives rise to the de facto conditions of open access in rangelands. 
Rangelands are viewed as open to all people in a village and that nobody in the 
village should be responsible for their management, which leads to the practical 
circumstances of free riding (Ho 2000). Such de facto open access regimes, in turn, 
give rise to the worsening conditions of grasslands in China. In response, policy 
makers and researchers put forward two distinct ways to solve these issues facing 
China’s rangeland tenure: (1) strengthening the current pasture contract system and 
thus promoting greater exclusion; and (2) forming the institutions of 
co-management on the basis of community participation (Banks 2003).  
As mentioned above, the reserve, especially BLF, adopted the first approach. 
All of the five respondents from BLF viewed the establishment of exclusive 
individual use rights in rangelands as one of the primary steps toward grassland 
conservation. They believed that when local herders are allocated a plot of pasture 
                                                        
20 This can be particularly illustrated by the inconsistencies among respondents about when BLF contracted 
pastures to rancher households: while a large percent of respondents indicated that contracting was undertaken 
in 2003, there was also some indication in the interviews that rangeland use rights were contracted to ranchers 
in the 1970s. 
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which excludes other users, they have more incentives to invest in improvement of 
the pasture and to stock their livestock within the carrying capacity of the pasture. 
Using one respondent’s words: 
Now the rangelands have been allocated to individuals. He (the 
rancher) himself raises livestock according to the area of his 
own pasture and the carrying capacity [of the pasture]. Moreover, 
he will manage and improve [the pasture] whenever the slight 
desertification occurs, and thus will play a role in ecological 
conservation. (A manager from BLF)  
They further perceived that under such an individualized land use system, 
people who manage and invest in the rangelands get the benefits from their capital 
and labor input. Such a system, therefore, was seen by the five respondents from 
BLF as one of the most important mechanisms to promote the involvement of local 
herders in land and resource management.  
Nevertheless, from an institutional perspective, researchers (i.e., Banks 
2001; Banks 2003; Ho 2000) claimed that the household contract system is not an 
efficient and effective land right regime in the grassland context; rather, they put 
forward group tenure arrangements or common property regimes as alternatives. 
They suggested that the contract system tends to involve high transaction costs in 
terms of fencing and monitoring/enforcement of boundaries, etc. (Banks 2001; 
Banks 2003; Ho 2000). For instance, the centralized approach, by which the 
Animal Husbandry Bureaus and their range police forces supervise the enforcement 
of carrying capacity on grasslands, is far from cost-effective and thus difficult to 
put into effect. In addition, the fixed boundary and strict exclusion implied in the 
contract system work poorly on the ground given the fact that mobility and flexible 
access are needed to deal with the high variability in spatial and temporal 
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distribution of rangeland resources (Banks 2001).  
 
4.3 Land use conflicts 
XBR, as part of grassland regions in China, has many common 
characteristics with the country’s grasslands in terms of land rights and resource 
use practices. However, being a biosphere reserve or nature reserve makes it 
distinctive in land and resource uses from other pastoral regions in that it involves 
more stakeholders in property relationships and incurs more restrictions on 
resource access and use. This section examines the currently most dominant land 
use issues and relationships between local communities, the MB, BLF, as well as 
other private or public entities within XBR. More specifically, it explores land use 
conflicts involving different groups with land use interests based variously on: (1) 
the livelihood need of local communities; (2) the profit goals of private and public 
entities; and (3) the conservation goals of the MB and its supporting conservation 
agencies. Two primary forms of ongoing land use conflicts exist within XBR - the 
conflicts between BLF and the MB, and between the reserve and local 
communities.  
 
4.3.1 Baiinxile Livestock Farm vs. the Management Bureau 
A predominant part of the conflicts between BLF and the MB is centered on 
land use rights. Compared to the reserve (established in 1985), especially the MB 
(founded in 1999) or its original organization, the Management Division (founded 
in 1994), BLF has a much longer history in the region, given its creation in 1950. In 
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addition, as is referred to above, use rights to most of the core and buffer zones are 
vested with BLF. On the other hand, the foundation of the reserve was not 
accompanied by any changes to the existing land and resource rights21. In other 
words, when they were founded, the reserve management organizations from the 
Management Division to the MB were not entitled to any land rights in XBR.  
Nonetheless, both of these two generations of reserve authorities (the 
Management Division and the MB) regarded gaining land use rights in XBR, 
especially the use rights to the core, buffer, and experimental zones, as one of the 
most important preconditions for them to perform their roles and functions. In 
addition, respondents attributed many obstacles they face in their management 
activities to the MB’s absence of land rights in the reserve: 
The greatest difficulty currently confronting our reserve is that 
the management rights and land rights are still separated. Now, 
we have no land rights, which are vested with BLF. So 
concerning conservation, we encounter great difficulty in the 
management when BLF owns land rights. (A member from the 
MB)   
Such perspectives on the MB’s lack of land rights are at least partly true 
given the current administrative and decision making power contexts in China 
(These contexts are stated in Section 5.1.1). However, these perceptions are also 
somewhat prejudiced given the evidence that some PA authorities, both in China 
and other nations, can successfully preserve the biodiversity without being entitled 
to any land rights. In this regard, for the MB to effectively manage XBR, there 
must exist alternatives to the MB’s direct achievement of land rights in the reserve 
                                                        
21 Because in China, most of the reserves were established after the confirmation of land rights (typically in the 
late 1970s and the 1980s when the Household Responsibility System was implemented) in the regions where 
the reserves are situated, the central government declared that the already confirmed land ownership and use 
rights in these regions remain unchanged when the reserves are founded (Han 2000). 
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such as the formation of partnerships for reserve management (refer to Section 
5.1.2 and Chapter 6).  
Moreover, the reserve authorities’ viewpoints associated with land rights 
also embody certain consequences: (1) The reserve authorities have attempted for 
almost ten years to achieve land use rights in XBR. As a result, the reserve has thus 
far attained use rights to the four core zones, two experimental zones, and the 
ecotourism service center, among which the reserve achieved the land use permit to 
only one zone (Han et al. 2002). In addition, the efforts to get land rights to these 
areas have cost them a significant part of their limited human and financial 
resources; (2) The reserve staff have also focused most of their conservation and 
management activities on these areas, partly because only for these zones do they 
have use rights. For example, from 1985 to 2001, RMB 912,600 yuan has been 
invested by the reserve authorities into the core and experimental zones, the total 
area of which is extremely small compared to that of the whole reserve (Han et al. 
2002). This is a remarkable figure given the meager total input of RMB 3,398,600 
yuan for the reserve during the same period (refer to Table 7). Therefore, for the 
transition zone which encompasses a significant part of XBR’s area, the reserve 
authorities have not made, and are unlikely to make, adequate efforts; (3) In the 
updated Management Plan for XBR (State Forestry Agency et al. 2003), it is 
proposed to delineate another three core areas in XBR and thus increase the total 
number of core zones to eight. The plan also proposes to expand the area of the five 
existing core zones. As a result, with the three new core zones, the total area of core 
zones in XBR is planned to be increased from 18.5 km2 to 58.73 km2 (State 
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Forestry Agency et al. 2003). 
The MB’s (and the Management Division’s) long-term struggle for land 
rights to the core, buffer, and experimental zones, along with its focusing efforts on 
these areas, gives rise to the ongoing conflicts between the MB and BLF. From the 
perspectives of respondents from the MB, BLF officials have been resistant to the 
existence of XBR as the reserve “occupies BLF’s territory” (A member from the 
MB). On the other hand, respondents from BLF perceived that XBR has not 
brought any economic benefits to the farm. Moreover, the MB-BLF conflicts are 
represented in an important sight-seeing location within XBR, the Baiinxile 
Grassland Ecotourism Area. The Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area is under the 
jurisdiction of BLF, and is also, undoubtedly, within the boundary of XBR. With a 
total area of 3,407 km2, the Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area encompasses 
most of BLF’s territory and the three core zones of XBR. The MB’s ecotourism 
service center is also situated within this area. The Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism 
Area is located 52 km southeast of Xilinhot Municipality.  
BLF takes the entrance fees to the Ecotourism Area as the farm’s own 
income. Two types of visitor entrance fees are defined: they are respectively RMB 
5 yuan and 10 yuan per person. The former price is applied for those who have 
some kinds of relations (guanxi) with BLF, the MB, or other stakeholders within 
the area. For example, someone who claims to be the acquaintance of the director 
of BLF’s Production Division can enjoy the preferential entrance fee of RMB 5 
yuan. Moreover, with regard to the income from the visitor entrance fees, there are 
great discrepancies between two respondents who are from the MB and BLF, 
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respectively. A respondent from the MB indicated that the visitor entrance fee 
generates a considerable income of RMB 45,000 yuan annually for BLF, and that 
as the Ecotourism Area is within XBR, the MB should be allowed to share part of 
that money. But on the other side, a respondent from BLF said that the farm not 
only gets no profits from the Ecotourism Area but has to subsidize its operation 
with RMB 200,000 yuan per year. 
Furthermore, another source of conflict between the MB and BLF emerges 
from their overlap in the tourist market. Both the MB and BLF operate tourist 
services. As the most promising and profitable site for tourism operation in XBR is 
the Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area, the MB also tries to make a profit from 
this area, for example, through its ecotourism service center situated within the 
Ecotourism Area. In addition, the MB and BLF advertise their tourism resources to 
the exclusion of one another, with the former focusing on the whole reserve and the 
latter on the Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area. At this point, two sets of 
pamphlets for tourists and visitors have come from the MB and BLF respectively, 
which are excerpted and translated in Table 8. 
Table 8: The Management Bureau and Baiinxile Livestock Farm’s propaganda 
of their tourism resources 
From the MB’s brochure: From BLF’s brochure:
Xilingol Grassland Nature Reserve 
was established in 1985…On 
September 7, 1987, it was 
internationally recognized by the 
UNESCO MAB program. In 1993, it 
joined in the Chinese MAB network. 
And it set up twinning relationships 
with Bookmark Biosphere Reserve 
based in Australia in 1995.  
Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism 
Area…was internationally 
recognized by the UNESCO MAB 
program in 1987. In 1993, it joined in 
the Chinese MAB network. And in 
December 1997, it was decreed by 
the State Council as the first national 
level grassland nature reserve in 
China.  
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Additionally, photos of the certificates of XBR’s acceptance into the 
international and Chinese biosphere reserve networks are included in the pamphlet 
that is disseminated at the Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area (Figure 8). Except 
for the two photos of the certificates of XBR’s acceptance into the international and 
Chinese biosphere reserve networks, in the whole pamphlet, XBR is not mentioned 
at all. This is quite misleading to outsiders who may view the Ecotourism Area as 
an independent reserve, rather than a part of XBR. Managers from BLF utilize the 
image of XBR to advertise their tourism resources, while at the same time they are 
unwilling to cooperate with the reserve staff in running tourism businesses. The 
MB, in return, gets a plot of land to fence, where its ecotourism service center as 
well as research and monitoring station are located, in the Baiinxile Grassland 
Ecotourism Area, allowing for some profits. This gives rise to the circumstances 
that BLF and the MB operate, disseminate, and benefit from their tourism resources 
to the exclusion of one other. In general, the conflicts between the MB and BLF 
take the form of the conflicts of interests in which land and resource rights play a 
significant role.  
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Figure 8: The pamphlet on Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area 
 
 
4.3.2 The reserve vs. local communities 
The conflicts between XBR and local communities are of the typical form 
of people-park conflicts found throughout the world. The reserve versus local 
community conflicts can be attributed to several major factors: fencing, 
resettlement, restrictions on resource use and access, and controlling livestock 
numbers on grasslands. These diverse factors respectively play a role in different 
functional zones in XBR. In other words, in different functional zones, people-park 
conflicts are centered on different kinds of lost benefits of local communities and 
different conservation objectives of these areas. The conflicts, both actual and 
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potential, between the reserve and local communities are outlined in Figure 9 
followed by a description in greater detail. 
Local communities 
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Figure 9: Outline of the conflicts between Xilingol Biosphere Reserve and local 
communities  
Conflicts between XBR and local communities can be attributed to several major 
causes such as fencing and resettlement, which play a role in different functional 
zones respectively. In addition, the people-park conflicts focus on a series of lost 
socioeconomic benefits of locals and a series of conservation objectives of the 
reserve. These lost benefits and conservation objectives are represented in different 
functional zones with different patterns and contents.  
 
Fencing 
All the core areas in XBR were fenced, under a status of strict protection. In 
the XBR Regulation, it is stated:  
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The core areas should be fenced. It is prohibited for anyone to 
enter into the core areas without permission. Anyone who wants 
to carry out scientific research within the core areas must, 
according to prescribed procedures, receive permission from 
relevant departments. 
In XBR, fencing was initially implemented by the alliance between the 
reserve and BLF right after the reserve was established. From 1985 to 1994, BLF 
had appointed a group of people to fence and maintain the core areas (Han et al. 
2002). From the reserve establishment until now, fences have been continuously 
rebuilt and repaired as they have been destroyed many times. Currently, the five 
staff from the MB’s research and monitoring station take charge of patrolling 
around the core areas, rebuilding and maintaining fences, and coordinating with 
inhabitants surrounding these areas.  
In the reserve, fencing gave rise to the displacement of residents who had 
lived in the core areas for generations and the prohibition of resource use within 
these areas. Respondents believed that fencing has compromised the interests of 
locals in that it reduces the total area of rangelands available for herders: “one more 
plot [of land] being fenced means that villagers lose one more plot of land or 
pasture” (A member from the MB). Additionally, during the process of building, 
rebuilding, and repairing of fences, local herders were seldom consulted, let alone 
provided compensation for their losses, by the reserve authorities (Interviews). 
In response, locals have resorted to violence in defense of their rights and 
interests. For instance, from the reserve establishment until now, local residents 
have continuously destroyed the fences surrounding the core areas (refer to Table 9) 
and grazed their livestock in these areas (Han et al. 2002). Using one respondent’s 
words:      
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After the establishment of the reserve, the conservation and 
management of the land in the reserve have threatened the 
benefits of local herders. This inevitably leads to conflicts. 
Herders resist when their own interests are threatened. Taking 
fencing as an example, they have destroyed the fences we built 
and have moved them at night. They have also broken the 
windows of the management station we set up. (A member from 
the MB) 
Table 9: Repair and damage of fences in several core and experimental zones 
of Xilingol Biosphere Reserve from 1993 to 2002 
Functional areas Repair times 
The cost of fencing 
materials 
(Unit: RMB 10,000 
yuan) 
The conditions of 
fences in 2002 
Core Area of Meadow 
Grassland Ecosystem in 
Chaganaobao 
1  Completely damaged 
before 1993.  
Core Area of Typical 
Grassland Ecosystem on the 
Hailiute Plain 
11 7.21 Damaged. The core area 
was in open condition.  
Core Area of Peace Meyeri in 
Taowuyintaolegai 
13 4.78 Damaged. The core area 
was in open condition. 
Core Area of Populus 
Davidiana and Betula 
Plytyphylla in the Abutouer 
Mountain 
13 4.2 In good condition.  
Experimental Zone of 
Degenerating Grassland in 
Dongtaizi 
7 3.92 Out of repair since 1999. 
Fences were lost.  
Experimental Zone of 
Huanghuagou Grass Cutting 
Field 
3 5.35 Completely damaged in 
the spring, 1995. Fences 
had not been repaired 
until 2002.   
TOTAL 48 25.55  
Source: Han et al. 2002: 79. 
Table 9 shows that fences surrounding the core and experimental zones 
have been destroyed by local residents again and again. Rebuilding and 
maintenance of the fences have cost the reserve authorities a considerable amount 
of money. The continuous damage to fences represents one impact of people-park 
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conflicts caused by the expropriation of resource use rights from local people 
without adequate consultation and compensation. Respondents were in basic 
agreement that the reserve establishment occurred after the residence of locals who 
had lived in the area for generations. And currently the reserve managers appear to 
pay more attention than before to coordinating with locals when they rebuild fences. 
For instance, the most recent rebuilding of fences that was implemented by the MB 
took place in 2003 in the Core Area of Peace Meyeri in Taowuyintaolegai. During 
the process, the reserve staff distributed propaganda pamphlets to residents around 
the core area, and requested them not to destroy the fences and to monitor the 
damage activities.  
Moreover, from the perspectives of respondents, the conflicts with herders 
around the experimental zones, which are also fenced, are not as intense as those 
taking place in the core areas. The MB has employed some residents living around 
the experimental zones with the wage of RMB 200 yuan per month to conserve and 
oversee these zones. The residents surrounding the experimental zones have also 
been allowed to cut grass in these areas once a year or once every two years. 
Further, respondents also believed that in the long run, the experimental zones will 
benefit locals in ways other than regenerating pastures. They also recognized the 
importance of involving locals in the management of these zones. According to 
respondents, the current conflicts occurring in the experimental zones were 
attributed to the lack of awareness among locals about the long-term benefits these 
areas can provide. Respondents further expressed that they should promote 
dissemination about conservation to improve local awareness. 
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 Resettlement 
Another potential source of conflict between the reserve and local 
communities is resettlement. In 2001, the Xilingol League government decreed a 
policy of “ecological migration of people” around the core areas of nature reserves. 
The policy declares that residents living around nature reserves’ core areas should 
be resettled within a time frame of one to two years. In XBR, this resettlement 
program is still underway in the buffer zones and is still in its early stage. The 
resettlement program has affected people in the buffer zones, the total area of 
which is 56 km2.  
Moreover, the program is too new to assess its impacts on the relationships 
between the reserve and local communities. In addition, while resettlement always 
proves to be controversial in PAs around the world, the degree of conflict depends 
upon how the process is implemented (Brandon et al.1998). So the following is 
focused on the ongoing process of the resettlement program implemented in XBR 
and the potential conflicts it may cause. The analysis is based on the main issues 
associated with the implementation of such resettlement programs, which include 
“whether people were consulted or compensated, whose lands were expropriated, 
who was compensated, at what value, within what time frame” (Brandon et al. 
1998: 19).  
In XBR, it is BLF, rather than the MB, that is implementing the program of 
“ecological migration of people” in response to the directive from above. This may 
be due to both the MB’s inadequate authority and its scarce human and financial 
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resources. The core issue of this reallocation program is that the land and resource 
use rights of the ranchers living in the buffer zones have been expropriated, at least 
to some extent. More specifically, residents in the buffer zones have to leave the 
places where they have lived for a long time. In addition, animal grazing, along 
with other forms of resource use and access, begins to be prohibited in these zones, 
although people resettled are entitled to cut grass within the buffer zones during 
certain periods in a year or over several years.  
Further, people resettled are provided the following compensation by BLF 
or the central government: 
● A plot of pasture in the transition area, which is allocated by BLF 
● RMB 30,000 yuan per household provided by the central government 
● The permits allowing grass-cutting in the buffer zones 
● Places to live (BLF has built two rows of rooms in the transition area 
for people who are reallocated to live), with water and electricity 
facilities provided  
● Alternative source of income including the programs of breeding milk 
cows, operating tourist services, and others. 
Despite the compensation, respondents perceived this resettlement program 
has had negative impacts on people resettled at least in the short term. First, they 
lost some economic benefits in the short run. Although they were allocated a new 
patch of pasture in the transition zone, the pastures reallocated are not comparable 
to the pastures in the buffer zones in terms of their total area and conditions of the 
grass. In addition, herders resettled had to shift their livelihood means from 
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livestock grazing to other businesses such as tourist services, which results in not 
only lost economic benefits but a break with their traditional patterns of living and 
working. As one respondent described:   
They have been living in the area for decades of years. They 
have been mainly dependent on livestock husbandry for a living. 
Now they are resettled out to operate business, tourism, breeding 
milk cows, and breeding livestock in pens. In the short term, 
their costs have increased and profits decreased. (A member 
from the MB)   
 
Restrictions on resource use and controlling livestock numbers on grasslands 
In XBR, people-park conflicts are also raised by the restrictions of resource 
use and access to local communities, as well as the policy of controlling livestock 
numbers on grasslands. Such conflicts take place in the transition area of the 
reserve. Respondents were in basic agreement that the reserve has influenced, to a 
greater or lesser degree, the land and resource uses of local communities in the 
transition area, although the impacts of the reserve on people in this area are not as 
remarkable as on those living in other functional zones. Further, the impacts are 
represented in two primary ways.  
First, the establishment of the reserve was accompanied by a series of rules 
and regulations on resource use and access, which are reflected in the XBR 
Regulation. According to the regulation, a wide range of activities such as land 
reclamation, logging, hunting, soil-digging, and medicinal-plant gathering are 
restricted, while these activities had been freely engaged in by local herders before 
the reserve was established. Not surprisingly, locals sometimes respond to the 
restrictions on resource use and access imposed by the reserve with conflict and 
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resistance:  
Herders have been living in this area for generations. Then we 
established the reserve, demarcated their living spaces within the 
boundary of the reserve, and let them do this and do that. This 
gave rise to direct conflicts. (A member from the MB)  
In addition, some respondents viewed such conflicts as the result of 
inconsistencies between ecological conservation and economic development of 
local herders. 
Furthermore, another influence of the reserve on inhabitants in the transition 
area is linked with the policy of “controlling livestock numbers” advocated by 
central and local governments. The basic principle behind this policy is that 
grassland degradation can be alleviated by lessening the pressures of livestock on 
grasslands. In XBR, local officials try to undertake cutbacks in stock numbers 
according to the carrying capacity of grasslands. This carrying capacity is 
determined through the estimation of local Animal Husbandry Bureaus. Further, the 
Animal Husbandry Bureaus and their associated range police forces are in charge 
of the monitoring and enforcement of the carrying capacity of grasslands. Taking 
BLF as an example, according to respondents, herders in BLF are required to 
control the number of their animals grazed on the pastures which they have leased. 
Stocking rate is determined by local Animal Husbandry Bureaus for these pastures. 
If the livestock numbers grazed in a pasture exceed the stocking rate, the rancher 
household which has contracted the pasture and has overstocked is required to 
dispose of the extra animals by selling or slaughtering within a regulated time 
frame. If the rancher household does not reduce its animal numbers on time, the 
Animal Husbandry Bureaus will have the extra animals sold and then return the 
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money to the rancher.  
Nevertheless, reductions in livestock numbers can have considerable 
influence on the livelihood of local ranchers. Local people are generally unwilling 
to reduce their numbers of animals. According to a report from the U.S. Embassy 
Beijing (U.S. Embassy Beijing Environment, Science, Technology & Health 
Section 2001), in recent years, ranchers in Xilingol League have been required to 
slaughter 40% of their animals each year, in practice these herders have reduced 
their livestock at the rate of about one-half of that which is required. This is quite 
understandable given that livestock husbandry provides the principal source of 
income to local herders. Thus, for them, reducing livestock numbers means a 
decrease in their living standard.  
In addition, in response to the policy of “controlling livestock numbers on 
pastures,” herders are also called on to breed livestock in pens, or to simultaneously 
breed and graze animals. From the perspectives of respondents, breeding livestock 
in pens has a negative effect on local benefits in the short time, as breeding 
involves more costs than grazing. In addition, breeding is less favorable than 
grazing for the growth of some kinds of livestock such as sheep and goats. Another 
drawback of breeding livestock is that with long term animal grazing traditions, 
breeding appears to run counter to local people’s traditional land use practices 
which have been in existence for thousands of years. Livestock grazing is valued 
by locals because it not only provides the predominant means of sustenance for 
them, but it implies a close link with their cultural and social traditions.  
On the other hand, however, respondents also believed that locals can be 
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compensated for their lost interests through ecological conservation or the 
development of tourism resources in XBR. But such compensation is not available 
in the near future given the reserve’s current status. In other words, herders are 
called on to give up part of their current benefits for which they will be 
compensated in the future when ecological conditions improve and when tourism 
development in the reserve is profitable. However, whether herders can have the 
opportunities to share benefits from tourism in the future is quite questionable, 
given the current circumstances that they are seldom provided opportunities or 
resources to participate in the ongoing tourism operations in the reserve (refer to 
Chapter 6). In sum, it seems unjustifiable for these local people to be burdened with 
the lost benefits accompanying the existence of the reserve or government policies.  
 
Conflicts between the reserve and other local entities 
Conflicts between XBR and other local entities rely on the fact that the 
reserve designation leads to restrictions on land and resource uses to the public or 
private sectors within the reserve:  
[The reserve] restricts the activity space to these entities…For 
example, before [the establishment of the reserve] nobody 
supervised them, and thus they were able to do whatever they 
wanted to. Now the biosphere reserve was established, which 
brought about many rules and regulations that are unfavorable to 
them. This leads to…not so remarkable conflicts. (A member 
from the MB) 
 
4.4 Resolution of people-park conflicts 
The creation of a PA often implies that local use and access to natural 
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resources are restricted and that local communities bear the loss without being 
provided alternatives for economic development to satisfy their basic needs 
(Brandon and Wells 1992; McNeely 1995). In response to these lost opportunities, 
locals tend to be pitted against PAs in a variety of ways such as encroachment into 
or destruction of PA resources. On the other hand, in most cases, PA management 
authorities lack the ability, resources, and inclination to apply a constructive 
method to address people-park conflicts (Wells and Brandon 1993). 
From the interviews, the reserve staff realized that herders need to maintain 
productivity for their livelihood. Productivity depends primarily on livestock 
grazing which is at the core of many conflicts. In addition, they also perceived the 
conflicts as partly linked to the lack of awareness of the importance of conservation 
among local herders. For instance, respondents suggested that along with the 
increasing local awareness of the negative impacts of overgrazing on grasslands 
and on their personal livelihood, herders will voluntarily control their livestock 
numbers: 
In fact, the major issue is the conflict between conservation and 
local herders. Right? Anybody wants to raise more livestock. 
Right? But we have to control him (or her). This is the focus. 
But if he (or she) is aware of the focus, it will not be a conflict. 
(A member from the MB)  
Moreover, the MB’s lack of resources, especially funding, to resolve the 
conflicts between local people and XBR was also discussed by respondents. They 
regarded the focus of the conflicts as centering on the economic status of local 
residents. If the economic conditions of local herders could be improved through 
certain financial support, the relationships between the reserve and locals would 
improve. This can be illustrated by what one respondent said:  
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The reserve should bring economic benefits to local herders. In 
other words, through conservation, [we] let them actually get 
rich. By means of sustainable use of grassland resources…, the 
conservation, and the benefits the reserve brings to local herders, 
[we] let them indeed realize the importance of conservation. [We] 
let villagers gain benefits. This is important. (A member from 
the MB)  
In sum, respondents admitted that the successful resolution of people-park 
conflicts depends on providing locals with direct economic benefits, as well as the 
improvement of local awareness of conservation and the negative impacts of 
grassland degradation, by way of promoting environmental education. In fact, these 
two approaches advocated by respondents to resolve conflicts are intertwined: 
when local communities realize that XBR or conservation activities can offer them 
direct socioeconomic benefits, they will provide more support to conservation and 
less resistance to the reserve. Locals should benefit directly from PAs, which can 
serve as the compensation for their losses on the one hand, and as the motivation 
for them to conserve the natural resources within these areas, on the other 
(McNeely 1995).  
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CHAPTER 5: DECISION MAKING POWERS AND 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
 
This chapter examines decision making powers and processes as well as 
community participation in natural resource management in XBR. It is based on the 
framework provided by Venter and Breen (1998) which is presented in Figure 4. 
Section 5.1.1 describes decision making powers and processes in XBR, and 
presents the power relationships among a range of stakeholders including 
governments/government agencies and the MB, etc. Section 5.1.2 presents the 
existing and potential partners for reserve management, along with the description 
of the inevitable trend toward the formation of partnerships among a wide range of 
stakeholders in XBR to improve reserve management. Finally, Section 5.2 adds 
another important partner - local communities - to the partnerships for the 
management of XBR and thus makes the partnership framework illustrated in 
Figure 4 fully represented in this study. It evaluates the level of community 
participation in the reserve and presents community participation mechanisms 
applied in XBR.  
 
5.1 Decision making powers 
5.1.1 Decision making powers and processes in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve 
To comprehend the decision making powers and processes in XBR, it is 
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first necessary to have a basic appreciation of the distribution of authority in 
China’s political system. “Authority in China is fragmented by function, by 
territory, and by rank” (Lieberthal 1997: 4). More specifically, China has different 
territorial levels of governments: the central, provincial, city, county, township, and 
village levels. At the same time, there also exist different levels of government 
agencies defined by function, for example, the hierarchies of Environmental 
Protection Agencies, Forestry Agencies, and Agencies of Land and Natural 
Resources, etc. These government agencies range from the central to city levels. In 
addition, above each of these specialized government agencies typically sit at least 
two administrative bodies: the government at the territorial level at which the 
government agency exists, and the office in the same functional system but in the 
next higher territorial level of the agency (Lieberthal 1997). Taking the Xilingol 
League Environmental Protection Bureau as an example, its direct “upper levels” 
include the Xilingol League Government and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region Environmental Protection Bureau.   
In the above mentioned authority context, XBR is subject to the 
administrative authority of different governments whose territories are covered or 
partly covered by the reserve, including the governments of the four livestock 
farms, two banners (qi) and two townships (sumu) (Figure 10). In other words, 
XBR is a multi-jurisdictional area which straddles the jurisdictional boundaries of 
these local governments. Additionally, in any type of the functional areas of the 
reserve, whether in the core areas or the transition zone, it is these local 
governments that make decisions about resource use and management. For instance, 
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the government of Xiwuzhumuqin Banner (qi) is in charge of decision making 
powers regarding the management of the Core Area of Typical Grassland 
Ecosystem on the Hailiute Plain (refer to Table 1). 
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Figure 10: Flow diagram of decision making powers for Xilingol Biosphere Reserve 
Each box represents a component of the power structure for XBR. The flow of the decision making powers between the 
components is represented by arrows. The components which have most direct decision making powers on the management 
of XBR are represented by bolded boxes and arrows and are presented in additional detail in Figure 11.  
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Figure 11: The position of the fourteen interviewees in the decision making 
structure in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve 
Each box represents a component of the power structure for XBR. The flow of the 
decision making powers between the components is represented by arrows. 
Furthermore, as presented in Figure 10, the reserve is simultaneously under 
the powers and authority of a range of vertically organized government agencies. 
XBR is subject to the decision making authority of a hierarchy of Environmental 
Protection Agencies from central to league levels, with the State Environmental 
Protection Administration sitting at the top of this hierarchy. At the same time, 
other vertically arranged government agencies charged with agriculture, animal 
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husbandry, forestry, land and natural resources, and other sectors also have a stake 
in the management and decision making of XBR. In addition, the MB is 
“superimposed on this administrative pattern” (Dower 1995: 217) and “could be 
seen as yet another public body in an already confusing scene” (218). Figure 10 
basically describes the power relationships between XBR (or the MB) and the 
governments or government agencies which have direct or indirect authority and 
decision making powers on reserve management.  
As presented in Figure 10, decision making in XBR takes the form of a 
top-down, one-way process through a complicated bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Information and decision making are disseminated through a hierarchical 
administrative structure. In other words, administrative directives are transmitted 
from upper level governments and their agencies to the lower levels. At this point, a 
question is raised: where is the position of the MB in this decision making 
structure?  
In China, most of reserve management organizations such as the MB have 
no jurisdiction in the reserves which these organizations have been founded to 
manage and conserve. There is also no legislative support for the authority of such 
organizations on reserve management. As a result, these organizations tend to have 
few decision making powers to regulate and manage the reserves. In China, “the 
problem of lack of authority (wuquan wenti) and interference from other agencies 
was of primary concern to reserve managers” (Harkness 1998: 198). For instance, 
compared to the governments or their agencies listed in Figure 10, which have legal 
mandates for reserve management, and some of other stakeholders in XBR, the MB 
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proves to be relatively weak in terms of decision making powers and authority, 
leaving it vulnerable to inter-organizational conflicts and budget cuts. 
In XBR, it is the local governments which have jurisdictions within the 
reserve, rather than the MB, that carry out the programs for poverty alleviation, 
resettlement, ecological compensation22, and others. The financial and authority 
dilemmas faced by the MB impede it from taking charge of these programs, 
although it serves as the sole organization specifically responsible for fulfilling the 
management and conservation roles from the perspective of the whole reserve. As a 
consequence, a large part of the organization’s efforts have been focused on 
coordination with these local governments, especially BLF. From respondents’ 
perspectives, the MB’s lack of land rights leads to its limited authority in decision 
making and management of XBR, which in turn makes it unable to carry out 
“conservation in the true sense” (A member from the MB). As one respondent 
claimed:  
The reserve is in coordinated relationships with local 
governments. We still lack land rights, right? Land rights are 
still vested with local governments. There can be only 
coordinated relationships [between us and these local 
governments]. We coordinate. Then they convey [decisions to 
local communities]. (A member from the MB) 
As mentioned before, the reserve staff have so far put most of their efforts 
on the management and conservation of the core, buffer, and experimental zones of 
the reserve. They have had a large part of their limited human and financial 
resources invested in these areas, while they have dealt little with the management 
                                                        
22 “Ecological compensation” is used in China’s policy field to refer to the compensation provided to people 
who are resettled out of ecologically fragile environment or the buffer zones of nature reserves. In XBR, it is 
linked with the program of “ecological migration of people” surrounding the core areas (see Section 4.3.2 
under “resettlement”). 
 103
of the transition zone which encompasses the largest area in the biosphere reserve. 
Therefore, the efforts to coordinate with BLF have cost the reserve staff 
considerable time and energy. Moreover, the authority imbalance between the MB 
and BLF also gives rise to the difficulties faced by the reserve staff when they carry 
out projects on the ground. This can be illustrated by a respondent’s comments:  
As the land rights are vested with BLF, now we have great 
difficulties in reserve management. Today, when we want to 
initiate certain projects, we have to consult with BLF first. Then 
we always cooperate with BLF to co-apply or co-implement the 
projects. (A member from the MB) 
So what are the causes for the MB’s limited decision making powers and 
authority in the management of XBR?  
Firstly, the MB’s lack of decision making powers can be partly attributed to 
its organizational character. In China, most of reserve management organizations 
such as the MB serve as public enterprises (shiye danwei), which never have 
administrative powers and authority. Han (2000) suggested that the administrative 
authority of reserve management organizations should be strengthened, if they are 
to effectively fulfill their functions of conservation, management, and arbitration of 
illegal resource uses in the reserves.  
In this regard, respondents realized that the MB’s organizational character 
as a public enterprise (shiye danwei) is directly related to the organization’s 
inadequate authority within the reserve. On the other hand, a respondent perceived 
that decision making of the Xilingol League government represents the MB’s 
decisions because the Xilingol League government seeks advice from the MB when 
it wants to initiate a program in XBR such as a resource exploitation project and 
when it proposes some changes on land use policies:  
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The MB’s upper level unit is one of the Xilingol League 
government’s functional agencies – the Xilingol League 
Environmental Protection Bureau. So the decision making of the 
government may have represented the MB’s concern. (A 
member from the MB)  
Yet these words just imply the official languages of officials from 
government structures in the context of the one-way, top-down decision making 
process.    
Secondly, the lack of adequate legislative support, as well as the absence of 
clearly defined responsibilities, rights, and authority for the MB also contribute to 
its weak presence in the reserve. No legislation, regulations, or policies in the 
country clearly define what reserve management organizations should do to 
conserve natural resources in the reserves, what they can do, what their authority 
and rights are when they fulfill their conservation functions, how to ensure their 
enforcement powers to impede actions that threaten the biological diversity, and 
how to balance or ensure their powers and authority when they are involved in 
conflicts with other stakeholders in reserves such as local governments and their 
agencies. Taking the XBR Regulation as an example, it seldom refers to the power 
relationships between XBR’s management organization (currently it is the MB) and 
local governments/government agencies. Even when the power relationships are 
mentioned, the regulation only states that “when they design annual plans for land 
uses, the relevant agencies of governments whose jurisdictions are within the area 
of the nature reserve should seek suggestions from the reserve management 
organization” (Inner Mongolia, the National People’s Congress 2001: 1).  
Moreover, although the regulation declares the roles of the MB in reserve 
management (refer to Section 3.3.2 in which the MB’s primary roles defined by the 
 105
XBR regulation, along with the Nature Reserve Regulation, are listed), they are 
described in a general sense, which makes it difficult to provide any legislative 
basis for the MB’s decision making authority in managing XBR. Furthermore, the 
reserve Management Plans designed by the MB and conservation agencies serve 
more as an instrument to apply for funding from governments and their agencies 
than as the documentary basis for the MB’s responsibilities and rights. On the other 
hand, even if the strong legislation for the management of reserves exists in China, 
the scarce personnel and logistical resources for these reserves make the 
enforcement of such legislation problematic. The MB’s lack of authority, therefore, 
is simultaneously intertwined with its financial and personnel scarcity.  
Finally, with regard to its establishment, the MB is not a locally-initiated 
organization, but a government founded organization, with its members either 
appointed by governments and their agencies or working as employees. In addition, 
the establishment of the organization was not accompanied by adequate 
empowerment for the MB to perform its roles. As a consequence, the formation of 
collaborative relationships with local governments and government agencies, local 
communities, and other stakeholders in XBR is of great significance for the MB to 
effectively fulfill its conservation functions.  
In numerous countries around the world, different forms of liaisons are 
often established to facilitate shared decision making and power sharing among 
stakeholders and interest groups in PAs. This is particularly the case when the 
management of the multi-jurisdictional areas such as biosphere reserves or river 
basins is concerned. In China, there is also a trend toward the foundation of 
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collaborative relationships or partnerships among different stakeholders in decision 
making and management of reserves. Under such circumstances, XBR has also 
started its first step toward the formation of partnerships, which is stated in the 
following section.  
 
5.1.2 Pathways to partnerships 
In the multilevel administrative system for managing XBR which is 
presented in the last section, negotiations and coordination are needed between the 
hierarchy of governments and their agencies, if the consensus about certain issues 
of the reserve is to be reached. While the complicated inter-agency relationships 
have existed in the region for a long time, the establishment of the reserve has 
undoubtedly exacerbated the originally intricate power relationships among these 
government actors. Plus the poorly defined responsibilities, rights, and powers 
among these different actors in reserve management, conflicts and disputes are 
frequently the consequence. For example, respondents viewed conflicts between a 
broad range of interest groups in XBR as one of the key barriers for effective 
management of the reserve.  
Many of the stakeholders may have realized the adverse influence of such 
conflicts on reserve management. However, few of the organizations are willing to 
take the initiative to build up collaborative relationships with each other, because 
they are afraid that the partnership “threatens them as it undermines their authority 
and expertise” (Kolavalli and Kerr 2002: 228). Such challenges threatening the 
formation of inter-organizational cooperation are enlarged when the issue of 
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cross-jurisdictional management is concerned. For instance, the local governments 
whose territories are within XBR may hesitate to cooperate with other stakeholders 
as they fear that their authority and powers might be threatened by the cooperation 
beyond their jurisdictions. As a consequence, the relationships among all 
stakeholders in XBR have been based on the in situ administrative levels.  
Nonetheless, along with the increasing emergence of partnerships or other 
collaborative relationships on PA management both worldwide and in China, XBR 
is also on the pathway to partnerships, although a great number of challenges 
remain before success can be claimed. In addition, during the 20 years since its 
establishment, XBR has also laid some foundation for the formation of partnerships 
for reserve management. For example, the alliance between the reserve and BLF 
had been in existence for about nine years, although unfortunately it ended with 
dissolution, as is referred to above. Further, there are also many existing and 
potential partners of XBR. These partners can contribute to the management and 
conservation of XBR in different ways such as the provision of financial, technical, 
and manpower resources to the reserve. Additionally, the formation of partnerships 
among these different agencies, organizations, or groups which have a stake or 
interest in reserve management is critical for effective conflict resolution in XBR. 
At this point, the primary existing and potential partners of XBR are presented 
below:  
 
Local governments: Local governments which have jurisdictions within 
XBR are critical stakeholders in the reserve. It is referred to above that the decision 
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making powers on the management of all the reserve’s functional zones are vested 
with these local governments. BLF had been in alliance with the reserve and had 
assisted reserve management for about a decade (From 1985 to 1994). But recently 
the conflicts with BLF have become one of the major impediments for the MB’s 
ability to perform its functions. Along with the MB’s conservation and management 
activities increasingly extending to the transition area, the interactions and 
collaboration with local governments other than BLF will become more and more 
important.  
 
Government line agencies: The partners of XBR included into the 
category of government agencies primarily consist of those government units at the 
league level such as the Xilingol League Animal Husbandry Bureau (see Figure 10). 
These agencies are important actors in decision making processes in XBR. For 
example, the Xilingol League Animal Husbandry Bureau takes charge of estimating, 
determining, and supervising the enforcement of the carrying capacity of grasslands 
in the reserve. In addition, currently the Xilingol League Environmental Protection 
Bureau acts as the direct upper-level agency of XBR and takes the role of 
overseeing reserve management.  
Moreover, government agencies at the central or autonomous region levels 
also have administrative authority and decision making powers in reserve 
management. For instance, the State Forestry Agency has directly participated in 
the design of the 2003 Management Plan for XBR. In general, these government 
line agencies “have functional responsibilities of extension and regulation” (413) 
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and they assume administrative authority in specific sectors (Murphree 1994). 
 
Universities and research organizations: The primary research partners of 
XBR include the University of Inner Mongolia and the Inner Mongolian Grassland 
Ecological Research Station of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The Inner 
Mongolian Grassland Ecological Research Station was founded in the reserve in 
1979. It has carried out a lot of research on the grassland ecosystem in XBR. In 
addition, the research station has assisted XBR in ecological monitoring and 
defining the carrying capacity of the grasslands. It has also offered the analysis of 
the causes for and the potential solutions to grassland degradation in XBR. In 1994, 
the Chinese National Committee for Man and the Biosphere Programme took the 
initiative to establish an organization responsible for providing scientific and 
technical support for XBR. The Inner Mongolian Grassland Ecological Research 
Station and the University of Inner Mongolia joined in the organization as advisory 
members. Unfortunately, this organization has existed only on paper due to the lack 
of effective cooperation mechanisms among its members and XBR’s own plights 
(Han et al. 2002). 
 
Other biosphere reserves: In 1995, XBR formed a twinning relationship 
with the Bookmark Biosphere Reserve based in Australia. Based on this 
international collaborative relationship, the two biosphere reserves have made 
thirteen visits to one another and have discussed their management experiences. 
Through the twinning relationship, the MB managers and some government 
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officials have achieved considerable training opportunities. 
 
Donor and aid agencies: The Canadian International Development Agency 
has implemented the project of Biodiversity Protection and Community 
Development in six nature reserves in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region23. XBR 
is one of the six project sites. The project started in 2001. It aims to provide 
technical support for the management of the nature reserves, and to improve 
community participation and inter-agency coordination in reserve management. 
According to respondents, through the project, the Canadian International 
Development Agency has brought about some training programs to the MB, in 
which the reserve staff received training on planning/design of XBR’s interpretive 
room and conducting social surveys among local herders. The donor agency is now 
launching its projects in other nature reserves in Inner Mongolia. Respondents from 
the MB expected the Canadian International Development Agency will initiate 
another extension of its project to XBR in the near future.   
 
National Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): NGOs have played 
a critical role in PA management worldwide, particularly in building up cooperative 
relationships among different interest groups and stakeholders in PAs. In contrast to 
government agencies, NGOs are able to address management issues faced by PAs 
fairly efficiently because of the characters inherent with such organizations. “Being 
issue- and problem-specific, they can mobilize financial and personnel resources 
                                                        
23 Sources: [On-line] http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/vLUDocEn/7A6522C917 
E448D585256879006FDC67?OpenDocument#17 
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comparatively quickly and efficiently” (Murphree 1994: 416).  
In such circumstances, NGOs in China such as The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) and World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) are increasingly playing a 
significant role in reserve management in terms of facilitating partnerships among 
various government agencies, different levels of governments, the reserve 
managers, as well as local communities. Although thus far there has been no NGOs 
active in XBR, they are important potential partners of the reserve. 
 
In August 2001, the Xilingol League government founded the XBR 
Management Committee which consists of three deputy directors of the Xilingol 
League government and the heads of fourteen relevant government departments 
(Han et al. 2002). Although thus far the committee has not made remarkable 
performance on inter-organizational cooperation and conflict resolution in 
managing XBR, its creation has laid the foundation for effective partnerships for 
reserve management. The Management Committee can be seen as a type of formal 
mechanism to facilitate cross-jurisdictional cooperation. Moreover, the committee 
has the potential to lay the groundwork for the management of the biosphere 
reserve as a whole unit (refer to Chapter 6 for recommendations for the formation 
of partnerships for XBR based on the current XBR Management Committee). 
 
5.2 Community participation 
To understand community participation in XBR, it is first necessary to have 
a brief appreciation of decision making processes occurring at the lowest 
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administrative level - the administrative village. In an administrative village, a 
village committee (cunzhibu) is responsible for the village’s management. A village 
committee typically consists of a village chairman, a Communist Party secretary, 
and a village accountant. Typically the village chairman is elected by village 
members, often at public meetings held within the village. Electing the village 
chairman and attending village meetings are primary ways for villagers to 
participate in the decision making and management of the village. A detailed 
analysis of community involvement in decision making at the level of the 
administrative village is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, this section 
focuses on the assessment of community participation at the scale of the whole 
biosphere reserve.  
 
5.2.1 Evaluation of the level of community participation in Xilingol Biosphere 
Reserve 
This section evaluates the level of community participation in decision 
making and natural resource management in XBR, based on Arnstein’s ladder of 
civic involvement (refer to Table 3 in Section 2.1.3). According to Arnstein’s ladder 
of civic involvement, community participation in XBR is now on the “informing” 
rung. Although the distinction between “informing” and “consultation” is hard to 
establish, I tend to regard community participation in XBR as closer to the 
“informing” category than “consultation.” This understanding partly depends on the 
statement of Chenoweth et al. (2002) that both consultation and placation are based 
on effective information dissemination and two-way communication, while 
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consultation implies that communities are informed about decisions and that their 
feedback is reported back to authorities. Moreover, at the level of “informing,” 
people are informed while their feedback tends to be ignored. In XBR, the effective 
information dissemination and two-way communication are lacking, and the 
feedback from local communities is always ignored by authorities. This can be 
illustrated by the following statements.  
During the process of designing and finalizing the Management Plans, there 
was no input from local communities. It is government agencies and the MB that 
are in charge of designing and implementing the Management Plans, while the 
voices from locals have not been incorporated. Furthermore, respondents claimed 
that they often coordinate with local governments, and then these governments, as 
the entities that “manage herders” (A member from the MB), convey their decisions 
to local people through a hierarchical administrative system. It can be inferred from 
these perspectives that local people in XBR are informed of decisions or programs 
through village meetings. In other words, locals’ voices can be heard at the lowest 
administrative levels - the administrative villages. In such top-down, hierarchical 
decision making structure, it is extremely questionable that their input is collected 
by village committees and reported back to relevant authorities such as 
governments and their agencies. The whole process of informing and decision 
making, therefore, takes the form of top-down, one-way communication. Locals are 
informed; their feedback is heard at the village meetings and then is ignored by 
upper level decision making bodies. 
On the other hand, the reserve staff and locals have face-to-face 
 114
communications when the staff visit herder households and conduct social surveys. 
These communications, however, have been undertaken with only a small number 
of households in the reserve. In addition, such visits and survey programs always 
take the form of one-way education and dictation rather than productive 
interactions. In fact, feelings of being spoken to by the reserve staff may prevent 
local people from learning about reserve issues and providing support for 
conservation programs. In sum, Arnstein’s ladder of civic involvement helps to 
identify the lack of community participation in the management of XBR and 
inadequate efforts of the MB to involve local communities in decision making.  
 
5.2.2 Community participation mechanisms in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve 
As is referred to in the previous section, community participation in XBR is 
quite limited. While local communities act as crucial stakeholders in managing 
XBR and an important potential participant in the partnerships for reserve 
management, their involvement in the decision making and management of the 
reserve is greatly needed. The improvement of community participation requires 
effective mechanisms, among other means. In this regard, the mechanisms for 
public participation (see Table 4 in Section 2.1.3) provided by Mitchell (2002) are 
informative to provide some guides. Various people have different abilities and 
preferences in communication and participation. So it is obvious that innovative 
and situation-specific participation methods and communication styles are required 
to promote community participation in XBR.  
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Public meetings: For XBR, public workshops or public meetings have the 
potential to become effective participation approaches by which community 
members are provided with opportunities to meet with the reserve staff or 
government officials and with each other. In addition, through public meetings, 
local communities can “get a chance to present their views directly to management” 
(Chenoweth et al. 2002: 507). 
Nonetheless, such public meetings have never been held by the MB or 
governments/government agencies in the reserve. In other words, public meetings 
open to local governments, local communities, or their village committees within 
XBR have been absent so far. From respondents’ explanations, the absence of 
public meetings in the reserve is mainly due to the dispersed nature of communities 
and individual herder households. Respondents claimed that many herders have no 
transportation to commute to meeting places which may be far away from their 
households. In addition, local people are engaged in their household work on a 
day-to-day basis, which reduces their interest in such meetings. They further 
explained that as an alternative to such public meetings, the reserve staff make 
home-visits to local households. Sometimes they bring several households together 
when these households are near to each other or they live together, for example, the 
households of siblings who live together or nearby. Such small-scale gatherings can 
be seen as a form of public workshop held among several households.  
However, all these household visits or small-scale gatherings conducted by 
the MB are focused on, and limited to, residents around the core areas. Generally 
speaking, the reserve administration and its supporting agencies have never 
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convened public meetings where local communities, local governments, 
government agencies, and other interest groups can sit together, discuss the issues 
faced by the reserve, and present their own needs. The mechanism of public 
meetings for community participation has so far not been applied in XBR.  
 
Task force: The application of the task force mechanism for local 
participation is very limited in XBR. A limited number of community members 
have participated in a small number of conservation programs implemented in the 
reserve. These programs include building and maintaining fences and tourist 
facilities, patrolling and monitoring, grass-planting and grass-cutting, etc. Through 
these task forces, some local inhabitants have participated in the conservation of 
XBR.  
 
Advisory groups: In some nature reserves in China, “Joint Management 
Committees” (gongguan weiyuanhui) have been established (Han 2000). Such 
management committees are one type of advisory groups which can address the 
management issues of nature reserves. However, as they are still in their infancy, 
these management committees are confronted with many problems and difficulties. 
For instance, Han (2000) claimed that in China, the management committees have 
put more efforts on conveying responsibilities of conservation to local communities 
than on coordinating with locals. Moreover, one of the important objectives of the 
management committees should be the involvement of local communities in the 
decision making and management of reserves. In other words, local communities, 
 117
whether villagers or their village leaders, must have some stake in the Joint 
Management Committees.    
The XBR Management Committee is described in Section 5.1.2. The 
committee has the potential to lay the groundwork for the foundation of 
partnerships among a wide range of interest groups including local community 
members. The committee should add community representatives to its membership. 
It can serve as an effective mechanism for community participation in reserve 
management. Given the current status that there is no participatory approach 
through which different individuals or interest groups can discuss and address 
issues from the perspective of the whole reserve, the Management Committee 
established for XBR should take a critical role in the involvement of local 
communities and other stakeholders in reserve management. It can also facilitate 
addressing the problem that the MB has over-focused its work in very limited areas 
of XBR. 
 
Social surveys: The mechanism of social surveys for public participation 
has been applied in XBR only a few times. Social surveys were one part of the 
programs that the Canadian International Development Agency initiated in XBR, 
which accompanied the project on Biodiversity Protection and Community 
Development implemented by the donor agency in six nature reserves in Inner 
Mongolia. According to respondents, the Canadian International Development 
Agency provided the reserve staff with technical support regarding social surveys. 
With the assistance from the experts of the donor agency, the reserve staff brought 
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together some households around the core areas and conducted social surveys with 
these people.  
  
Environmental mediation: As is referred to above, respondents 
appreciated the importance of local awareness of biodiversity conservation on the 
management of XBR. The MB has also tried to promote public awareness of 
conservation through environmental education. Environmental education can help 
increase communities’ knowledge of the reserve’s values/benefits and their interest 
in participation in conservation activities. In this regard, the MB has visited local 
households, and distributed pamphlets on XBR and the XBR regulation to people 
around the core zones. All the pamphlets are printed in the Chinese language. 
According to respondents, they have explained the contents of the brochures to 
Mongolian herders with the help of translators. Additionally, the MB’s 
interpretative room has played a significant role in environmental education for 
both visitors and tourists. The MB has also disseminated information about XBR 
and conservation to the broader public through television programs. According to 
interviewees, televisions are now fairly widespread among households in XBR.   
 
In summary, in the top-down decision making process in XBR, local 
communities are seldom provided with opportunities to participate in reserve 
management. Although the reserve managers have realized the importance of 
involving locals in the management of XBR, the MB itself is weak in the decision 
making powers and processes, and it lacks the resources and authority to empower 
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local communities. While currently it is the local governments or government 
agencies, which have legal mandates in XBR, that are making decisions on reserve 
management, the formation of partnerships among all interest groups is inevitable 
for empowering both the MB and local communities in decision making and 
resource management. I regard, therefore, during the current stage, the mechanism 
of advisory groups, which currently takes the form of the Management Committee 
in XBR, as being the best method for involving local communities and improving 
the management of XBR.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
So “Is the biosphere reserve empowered to meet the goals of 
community-based natural resource management through formal and informal 
institutions?”  
XBR, as an internationally recognized biosphere reserve, has not been 
empowered to meet the goals of CBNRM - to improve both the conservation of 
natural ecosystems and the socioeconomic conditions of local communities. Rather, 
from the perspective of the whole reserve, the existence of XBR has not exerted a 
favorable influence on the reserve’s landscape and biodiversity conservation. In 
addition, local inhabitants have thus far experienced more socioeconomic losses 
than benefits from the establishment and management of XBR. Moreover, the 
existence of XBR has not provided local people with opportunities to participate in 
decision making and reserve management, which is a basic principle of CBNRM. 
In this study, the research question was explored through the assessment of 
institutions relative to natural resource management in XBR.  
The institutional analysis of resource management practices in XBR has 
been quite informative for this research. The findings indicate that several 
institutions including the legislation, regulations, administrative structures, 
responsibilities associated with land and resource rights, decision making powers 
and processes, and community participation have great impacts on how natural 
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resources are used and managed in XBR. These institutions are not independent of 
one another; rather, they interact with one another to impact on resource use and 
management in the reserve. In addition, these institutions should be strengthened in 
order to improve resource management practices in XBR.  
Firstly, the country’s legislative frameworks and administrative structures 
for the management of PAs should be strengthened. More specifically, the PA 
system requires improvement in terms of clarifying the functions and properties of 
different kinds of PAs as well as permitted land uses in these areas. Further, there 
should be a holistic planning and management strategy for the establishment and 
management of PAs, and in particular, nature reserves. The State Environmental 
Protection Administration, as the central ministry responsible for the 
comprehensive management of nature reserves in China, can take the role of 
designing and enforcing the strategy. In addition, this strategy should clearly 
specify who should be in charge of the establishment and management of different 
kinds of PAs, what are their roles, the functions and properties of different 
categories of PAs, the procedures of PA establishment, what activities are permitted 
in different kinds of PAs, and what communication and coordination mechanisms 
are needed among different agencies when establishing and managing PAs in their 
own jurisdictions, etc. Moreover, for nature reserves in China, an effective 
legislative framework for managing these areas should be established to clarify 
issues concerned with reserve management such as the rules about land uses in 
nature reserves. A comprehensive enforcement mechanism for legislation and 
regulations in relation to natural resource management and PAs also needs to be 
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established to ensure the implementation of these legislation and regulations.  
Secondly, the organizational roles and functions of the MB should be 
improved to facilitate the management of XBR. As the sole organization 
specifically established to manage XBR, the MB is not as good as it could be at 
fulfilling its conservation and management roles. This is implied by the limited 
number of projects the MB has initiated in the reserve as well as the limited 
functions the MB has fulfilled. For instance, the MB has done little with ecological 
monitoring and communication with local communities, which are two primary 
functions that reserve management organizations such as the MB should perform. 
The MB’s performance on reserve management can be attributed to a lack of 
capacity that is due to the organization’s inadequate financial and human resources 
and its weak decision making powers. Lack of funding exerts a great number of 
negative impacts on the organization, which include poor working conditions, 
unstable personnel makeup, limited conservation projects, the MB’s direct 
engagement in profit-generating activities in XBR, and limited community 
participation in reserve management. Moreover, compared to local governments 
and government agencies which have jurisdictions within the reserve, and many 
other interest groups in XBR, the MB is relatively weak in terms of authority and 
decision making powers. In other words, the MB does not have any legal and 
administrative authority for reserve management. In this regard, the legal 
empowerment of reserve management organizations in China, such as the MB, is 
required. 
The practical way to resolve the MB’s limited financial and human 
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resources, as well as its inadequate decision making powers rests on the formation 
of partnerships with other interest groups and stakeholders in the reserve. Based on 
its available resources and capacity, the MB cannot fulfill its conservation roles 
alone. Instead, it has to win support from different sectors in terms of funding, 
manpower training, human resources, and administrative and legal support, etc. In 
this regard, the partnership is an inevitable way for the MB to fully perform its 
roles and functions.   
Unfortunately, the MB has not realized the importance of building 
partnerships with other interest groups and stakeholders in XBR. Rather, it has 
attributed many of its difficulties to the lack of land rights in the reserve and has 
made great efforts in terms of money and manpower to achieve land rights in the 
core and experimental areas in XBR. As a consequence, conflicts between the MB 
and BLF arise, which are always centered on land use rights. In this regard, the MB 
is better off conforming to the existing land rights of other stakeholders in XBR and 
particularly BLF, which have been confirmed before the reserve was established, 
and turning conflicts into cooperation through founding collaborative relationships 
such as partnerships with these stakeholders. At this point, land and resource rights 
have impacted the power relationships among different entities in XBR. They also 
have exerted great influence on resource use and access in the reserve.   
Thirdly, the institution of land and resource rights has also played an 
important role on people-park relationships. The conflict between XBR and local 
communities is also a kind of conflict between conservation and local economic 
development. In other words, the creation and management of the reserve have 
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reduced socioeconomic benefits to locals in terms of restricted resource access and 
use, displacement of locals, and declining living standard, etc. To defend their 
rights and interests, sometimes local people have to resort to violence. For 
example, locals have destroyed reserve facilities many times. The resolution of 
such people-park conflicts rests on providing locals with adequate compensation 
for their losses, and improving local awareness of conservation.  
Although the reserve staff and BLF managers realized the importance of 
local benefits from the reserve, locals in XBR still bear considerable losses and 
costs accompanied with reserve establishment and management, as indicated by 
those listed in the left column of Figure 9. The compensation provided to these 
people, nonetheless, is far short of what is adequate. Brandon and Wells (1992) 
presented three ways by which the compensation of a PA to locals can take place: 
(1) compensate locals for the economic losses associated with the creation of a PA; 
(2) afford substitutes for the resource access that has been prohibited; (3) provide 
alternative sources of income to substitute those which are unavailable because of 
the PA establishment. Based on these three methods, more researchers (e.g., 
Brandon and Wells 1992; Munro 1995; Murphree 1994) have provided a wide 
range of specific approaches to improve compensation. These approaches are listed 
in Table 10, along with the compensation implemented in XBR. Recommendations 
for the application of these approaches are also provided by the table.  
 
Table 10: Compensation  
Compensation 
approaches* 
Description of the compensation 
implemented in XBR 
Recommendations 
Substitutes for 
resource access 
People resettled out of the buffer 
zones are provided with a pasture in 
the transition area and permits of 
grass cutting in the buffer zones. 
 
Cash payment  People resettled out of the buffer 
zones are compensated with RMB 
30,000 yuan. 
Cash payment is quite a straightforward approach to 
compensate locals. Locals are willing to accept cash 
compensation as it provides direct and instant benefits to 
them. This approach can be extended to people living in the 
transition area especially considering that herders in this area 
are unwilling to reduce their number of livestock and that the 
alternatives to livestock grazing are not currently profitable. 
For example, herders who are required to control their 
livestock numbers can be provided with some cash 
compensation for their lost economic interests.  
Goods or services  People resettled out of the buffer 
zones are afforded with places to 
live, and water and electricity 
facilities. 
This compensation approach can include other kinds of social 
services such as education and healthcare. The provision of 
social services should be extended to inhabitants in the whole 
reserve.  
Employment and 
income 
Locals have received jobs in 
building/maintaining fences and 
tourist facilities, as well as providing 
tourist services. But until now job 
opportunities have been quite limited 
and available for very few people in 
XBR. 
Employment and income can provide direct benefits to locals. 
Local people should be entrusted with the duties of daily 
patrolling, monitoring natural resources, developing and 
maintaining facilities, providing tourism services, 
coordinating and organizing conservation programs, and 
others.   
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Low-interest loans Not applied in XBR.  Low-interest loans should be provided to locals to operate 
tourism, breeding milk cows, and other small enterprises.  
New skills training Not applied in XBR.  A range of training programs such as the training on the 
operation of small business and livestock breeding are greatly 
needed in XBR. The MB should try to get support from 
different sectors especially NGOs to facilitate training and 
education and to provide resources for training programs 
open to local residents. 
  
Tourism  Currently benefits of tourism to 
locals are confined to limited job 
opportunities and renting horses to 
tourists.  
Locals can receive jobs from tourism operations. Local 
people often operate their own tourism business with the 
assistance of technical training and low-interest loans. Locals 
can also become tourism operators by providing 
transportation, housing accommodation, and food, etc. 
Tourism can also provide local benefits through employment 
opportunities such as tour guides, drivers, hotel workers, and 
offering cultural activities and in-park education programs.  
Promotion of local 
development projects 
Not applied in XBR.  Local development projects including trail repairs, building of 
schools and clinics, and the construction of other facilities 
and infrastructures should be implemented in XBR.  
Substitutes for 
livestock grazing 
Breeding livestock in pens and 
raising milk cows. 
Breeding livestock in pens has thus far brought about more 
costs to locals than livestock grazing. Local people need 
technical training on breeding livestock in pens and raising 
milk cows to improve their operation. Further, raising milk 
cows is a promising substitute for livestock grazing since it 
can produce considerable income. Yet milk cows are 
expensive for locals and they need low-interest loans to get 
milk cows.  
 
*The compensation approaches listed are based on those advocated by Brandon and Wells (1992), Munro (1995), and Murphree 
(1994). 
As presented in Table 10, the compensation that has been provided in XBR 
is quite limited, compared to the losses locals have suffered. Respondents regarded 
the greatest benefits that the reserve can provide to locals have been, and will come 
from, tourism development. The potential for profits from tourism, however, 
appears unpromising, given XBR’s limited tourism resources and the relatively low 
level of scenic attractions caused by degraded conditions of the grasslands. Overall, 
respondents believed that locals have lost benefits in the short term. However, they 
also believed these losses can be compensated for in the future by the income from 
tourism development. In other words, after the ecological environment in XBR has 
regenerated, more tourists will be attracted to the reserve, and tourism income will 
increase.  
The prospects that respondents described seem quite promising. 
Nevertheless, these prospects are unlikely to come to reality in the near future, 
given that the regeneration of grasslands is a long-term process and there is no 
indication that the grasslands are getting better. In addition, even when tourism can 
actually bring a considerable flow of benefits, a large part of these benefits may be 
captured by entities other than local residents. Such possibilities are exemplified in 
Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area.  
Currently there is a wide range of public and private sectors operating 
tourist services in Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area, which has the most scenic 
environment, and in turn, offers the largest potential for profits from tourism 
development in the reserve. This is supported by what one respondent said, 
indicating that most tourists just visit the same several sites in the reserve and 
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seldom go to other places. Almost all the sites mentioned by the respondent are 
situated in Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area, of which Zakstai Lake is an 
important sight-seeing and recreation location. Surrounding Zakstai Lake are 
patches of fenced zones, in which tourism activities are operated by a variety of 
entities including the MB (its ecotourism service center is located near the lake), a 
fishery enterprise of BLF, a police agent, and a tax agency of BLF, etc. From the 
tourism activities operated by these entities, local residents are offered limited 
employment opportunities and limited wages. Additionally, opportunities for 
investing in tourism operations in Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area are almost 
impossible for local herders, given their scarce capital resources as well as their 
lack of power and opportunities to obtain key tourism resources such as the rights 
to lease or use a plot of land in Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area. In sum, in 
Baiinxile Grassland Ecotourism Area, it is those public or private sectors, rather 
than local people, that get the predominant benefits, whatever the total amount of 
the profits might be, from tourism.  
Furthermore, while some herders have attempted to earn some money 
through self-investment in tourist services, their income is extremely limited. For 
example, from the fieldwork, I saw that some herders tried to rent their horses to 
tourists to ride and then they were able to earn some money. In addition, from the 
perspectives of respondents, renting horses to tourists is the primary approach that 
herders choose to invest in tourism. Herders tend to choose tourism activities 
requiring small inputs as they cannot afford a large capital investment particularly 
in light of the trouble they have getting loans. On the other hand, those tourism 
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activities requiring small investment such as renting horses are often the ones that 
generate limited income and profit. In response to the limited benefits that tourism 
can provide to local inhabitants, some respondents suggested that the country 
should provide financial support to locals for them to develop ecotourism. For 
instance, herders can use the money to build Mongolian tents for tourists to live in 
and to learn Mongolian customs and cultures.   
If the PA can maintain flows of income for local communities or 
compensate them for their losses, and can make the benefit-cost ratio of PA 
conservation positive for these communities, these areas can get support from local 
people (McNeely 1995; Munro 1995). In this respect, the benefit-cost ratio of 
conservation in XBR is negative for locals. In other words, local people have 
experienced more economic losses than benefits from conservation activities. Not 
surprisingly, the reserve has so far received more resistance than support from local 
communities. In the short run, the MB has inadequate resources and capacity to 
address the conflicts, as one respondent described when being asked how local 
communities can benefit from the reserve:  
Currently, local communities can receive very limited direct 
benefits from the reserve. Now we are expecting that we can 
benefit from communities…[Our] mechanisms are ineffective. A 
person with more disease helps others, which is just a prate. We 
are in great need of the help from communities. This is the 
current status of our reserve. Of course, if [the reserve] develops 
in the future, and is well conserved, communities can benefit 
directly…People can enjoy the healthy natural environment. 
This is the largest benefit. It is also good if they can benefit in 
terms of funding or economic development. But we don’t know 
when this can happen, or when we can achieve that. (A member 
from the MB)     
In sum, local communities have thus far experienced few benefits from the 
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reserve, while bearing considerable socioeconomic costs. Throughout the world, it 
is increasingly perceived as unjustifiable for local people to bear the costs of PA 
designation and management without receiving adequate compensation (e.g., 
Brandon and Wells 1992: Lusigi 1995; McNeely 1995). However, in XBR, there 
remains a long way to go for locals to be provided with adequate benefits and 
compensation, given the current political and economic contexts. In other words, 
there is a bumpy road ahead toward the resolution of the conflicts between XBR 
and local communities.  
Fourthly, the institutions of decision making and community participation 
should be strengthened. In the top-down, hierarchical decision making structure in 
the country, XBR is subject to the authority of a hierarchy of governments and their 
line agencies (refer to Figure 10), as well as other stakeholders in the reserve. In 
addition, XBR is a multi-jurisdictional area which is under the jurisdictions of 
several local governments. So it is those local governments that make decisions on 
reserve management. In this regard, the MB always has to coordinate with local 
governments to implement conservation projects. The power relationships among 
different stakeholders are quite complicated. In addition, conflicts among different 
stakeholders in XBR are frequently the case.  
Moreover, local communities have seldom participated in decision making 
processes on the management of XBR, in spite of how significant the impacts of 
the decisions may be on their life. According to findings from this research, 
community participation is quite limited in the reserve and locals’ voices are 
generally ignored in the decision making processes. In general, to facilitate the 
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management of XBR, the institutions of decision making and community 
participation need to be improved. Opportunities rest on the application of effective 
community participation mechanisms in XBR, as well as the formation of 
partnerships for reserve management, among others.  
Finally, the partnership is an inevitable trend if XBR is to improve its 
resource management practices and address a series of issues including the MB’s 
lack of financial resources and decision making powers, conflicts between different 
interest groups in the reserve as well as people-park conflicts, and lack of 
community participation in reserve management. XBR has to establish its 
partnerships and get support from a broad range of stakeholders and interest groups. 
Recommendations are provided below for the creation of effective partnerships for 
XBR based on the existing XBR Management Committee and Mitchell’s (2002) 
key elements for successful partnerships (refer to Table 2).  
First, the XBR Management Committee should expand their committee 
members or partners to encompass more organizations or groups including those 
presented in Section 5.1.2. According to Mitchell’s (2002) key elements for 
successful partnerships, all partners should be involved in reserve management 
with equitable representation and power. This requires powers and authority to be 
devolved from governments and their agencies and reallocated among all partners. 
However, there remains a long way to go before the actual achievement of the 
element of “equitable representation and power” (see Table 2), given the 
circumstances that the Management Committee is still in its infancy, along with the 
current bureaucratic context of XBR. In the immediate future, it may be more 
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realistic for the Management Committee to involve more partners and to afford 
them more opportunities to provide their input in reserve management. In other 
words, more partners should participate in the decision making process of the 
Management Committee with relatively limited decision making powers. This is 
consistent with Mitchell (2002)’s “consultative partnerships” (see Section 2.1.3), in 
which government agencies actively seek advice from their partners and decide to 
what extent the partners’ input will be incorporated into decisions.  
Second, based on the elements of “compatibility between participants” and 
“benefits to all partners” advocated by Mitchell (2002) for successful partnerships, 
the committee members should sit together and define the goals and objectives of 
the Management Committee. The consensus of these goals and objectives should be 
achieved among all partners. Mechanisms such as the Management Plan for XBR 
can be utilized as the basis of both the clarification of the common goals of the 
partners and the guidance for their activities as a member of the committee.   
Third, another element for successful partnerships presented by Mitchell 
(2002) is the “communication mechanisms.” Based on this factor, effective 
communication mechanisms should be established in the XBR Management 
Committee to facilitate information sharing and two-way communication among all 
partners. The mechanisms can take a broad range of forms from committee 
meetings to newsletters. Given the current circumstances in XBR, the mechanisms 
which have great potential for open and transparent information sharing include 
committee meetings, workshops, posters, newsletters, and meeting minutes, etc. In 
addition, committee members should meet regularly. Decisions made by local 
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governments or government agencies should be made open to all partners in the 
committee. The advice from the committee members should be sought when 
significant changes are proposed with regard to reserve management (Munro 1995).    
Fourth, the role of the MB in the Management Committee should be 
clarified and strengthened. The MB has the potential ability to act as a bridge 
between these diverse partners in the committee, as well as between these groups 
and local communities, given its role as a government appointed organization with 
a specific and strong focus on the management of XBR. In other words, the MB’s 
role of coordinating between different stakeholders or interest groups in the reserve 
should be emphasized. This may require the empowerment of the MB in the 
mandate of the Management Committee. In addition, the governments or their 
agencies should vest the MB with more powers and authority in the decision 
making process of the Management Committee. The capacities of the MB in 
reserve management, in turn, can be promoted through supports from all partners in 
the committee. 
Finally, local communities should be involved in the partnerships for XBR 
as “local participation in conservation activities is essential for building an effective 
partnership for conservation” (Gurung 1995: 232). This is also critical for the 
alleviation of the conflicts between XBR and local communities. In this regard, 
local communities must own some stake in the Management Committee. The 
committee should add community representatives to its memberships. These 
community representatives should be democratically elected by community 
members. The Management Committee, in turn, can become an effective 
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mechanism to improve community participation.  
In sum, a strategy for improving reserve management could rely on the 
improvement of the abilities and constitution of the current XBR Management 
Committee. The Management Committee has the ability to act as an integrating 
force between different government agencies and between these agencies and local 
populations, given its constitution and its specific focus on XBR (Dower 1995). In 
other words, the committee could become the basis for the foundation of effective 
partnerships for resource management and decision making in XBR. As a 
management body consisting of different stakeholders, the Management Committee 
could manage and plan the reserve holistically and incorporate input from different 
sectors.  
In conclusion, there is still a long road to travel for XBR before attaining 
the goals of CBNRM. The chance that CBNRM regimes will be implemented in 
XBR in the near future seems slim. This is because currently local residents have 
too little say in decision making and suffer “under oppressive bureaucratic 
constraints” (Barborak 1995: 36). In addition, “the lack of a supportive network of 
indigenous environmental NGOs to empower local inhabitants” (Jim and Xu 2002: 
339) in China also makes such community-based initiatives difficult to apply in 
XBR.  
Different institutions interact with each other to impact natural resource 
management practices in XBR. The management and conservation of XBR cannot 
be fulfilled by local factors alone. Rather, the management of XBR requires the 
improvement of much broader institutions such as the legislative and administrative 
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frameworks, and land tenure regimes in the country. On the other hand, local actors 
also play a critical role in the management of XBR because it is those local people 
who use natural resources on day-to-day basis and their livelihoods depend on 
these resources. Biodiversity conservation has to be reconciled with the 
socioeconomic needs of local residents. Only when it can fulfill the basic needs of 
local people can XBR survive and conserve the biological diversity of the 
grassland.  
 136
REFERENCES 
Agrawal, A. and C.C. Gibson. 1999. Enchantment and disenchantment: The role of 
community in natural resource conservation. World Development, 27 (4): 629-649. 
Arnstein, S.R. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American 
Institute of Planners, 35 (4): 216-224.  
Banks, T. 2001. Property rights and the environment in pastoral China: Evidence 
from the field. Development and Change, 32 (4): 717-740.  
———. 2003. Property rights reform in rangeland China: Dilemmas on the road to 
the household ranch. World Development, 31 (12): 2129-2142.  
Barborak, J.R. 1995. Institutional options for managing protected areas. In 
Expending Partnerships in Conservation, J.A. McNeely and IUCN (eds.), 30-38. 
Washington, D.C. Covelo, California: Island Press. 
Batisse, M. 1997. Biosphere reserves: A challenge for biodiversity conservation and 
regional development. Environment, 39 (5): 6-15, 31-33.  
Belsky, J.M. 1999. Misrepresenting communities: The politics of community-based 
rural ecotourism in Gales Point Manatee, Belize. Rural Sociology, 64(4): 641-666. 
Bradshaw, M. and E. Stratford. 2000. Qualitative research design and rigour. In 
Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography, I. Hay (ed.), 37-49. Victoria, 
Australia: Oxford University Press.  
Brandon, K., Redford, K.H., and S.E. Sanderson. 1998. Introduction. In Parks in 
Peril: People, Politics, and Protected Areas, K. Brandon, K.H. Redford, and S.E. 
Sanderson (eds.), 1-23. Washington, DC./The Nature Conservancy: Island Press.    
Brandon, K.E. and M. Wells. 1992. Planning for people and parks: Design 
dilemmas. World Development, 20 (4): 557-570.  
Brechin, S.R., Wilshusen, P.R., Fortwangler, C.L., and P.C. West. 2002. Beyond 
the square wheel: Toward a more comprehensive understanding of biodiversity 
conservation as social and political process. Society and Natural Resources, 15 (1): 
41-64.  
Brosius, J.P., Tsing, A.L., and C. Zerner. 1998. Representing communities: 
Histories and politics of community-based natural resource management. Society 
and Natural Resources, 11 (2): 157-168.  
Carroll, M.S. 1995. Community as an idea: A conceptual issue with practical 
implications. In Community and the Northwestern Logger: Continuities and 
Changes in the Era of the Spotted Owl, 20-30. Boulder: Westview Press.  
 137
Chenoweth, J.L., Ewing, S.A., and J.F. Bird. 2002. Procedures for ensuring 
community involvement in multijurisdictional river basins: A comparison of the 
Murray-Darling and Mekong River Basins. Environmental Management, 29 (4): 
497-509.  
Cortner, H.J., Burns, S., Clark, L.R., Sanders, W.H., Townes, G., and M. Twarkins. 
2001. Governance and institutions: Opportunities and challenges. In Understanding 
Community-Based Forest Ecosystem Management, G. Gray, M. J. Enzer, and J. 
Kusel (eds.), 65-96. New York, London and Oxford: Food Products Press, an 
imprint of The Haworth Press, Inc. (Co-published simultaneously as Journal of 
Sustainable Forestry, Volume 12, Numbers 3/4 and Volume 13, Numbers 1/2.)  
Crowe, G. and G. Allan. 1994. Introduction: Old and new themes in the sociology 
for community. In Community Life: An Introduction to Local Social Relations, 1-23. 
New York, NY: Harvester Wheatshaft.  
Dower, M. 1995. Working with people who live in protected areas. In Expending 
Partnerships in Conservation, J.A. McNeely and IUCN (eds.), 215-222. 
Washington, D.C. Covelo, California: Island Press. 
Dunn, K. 2000. Interviewing. In Qualitative Research Methods in Human 
Geography, I. Hay (ed.), 50-82. Victoria, Australia: Oxford University Press.  
Environmental Policymaking in China. 1998. China Environment Series, 2: 74-78. 
[Online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF4C9.PDF.] 
Gibson, C.C., Ostrom, E., and M.A. McKean. (eds.). 2000. People and Forests: 
Communities, Institutions and Governance. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Gray, G.J., Fisher, L., and L. Jungwirth. 2001. An Introduction to community-based 
ecosystem management. In Understanding Community-Based Forest Ecosystem 
Management, G.J. Gray, M.J. Enzer, and J. Kusel (eds.), 25-34. Food Products 
Press, an imprint of The Haworth Press, Inc. 
Gurung, C.P. 1995. People and their participation: New approaches to resolving 
conflicts and promoting cooperation. In Expending Partnerships in Conservation, J. 
A. McNeely and IUCN (eds.), 223-233. Washington, D.C. Covelo, California: 
Island Press. 
Han, N. 2000. Policy analysis and recommendations on management for China’s 
nature reserves. In Policy Study on Sustainable Management for China’s Nature 
Reserves, Chinese National Committee for Man and Biosphere Programme (ed.), 
1-21. Beijing: Scientific and Technical Documents Press. (In Chinese) 
Han, N., Jiang, G., and W. Li. 2002. Management of the Degraded Ecosystems in 
Xilingol Biosphere Reserve. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press.  
Harkness, J. 1998. Recent trends in forestry and conservation of biodiversity in 
 138
China. In Managing the Chinese Environment, R.L. Edmonds (ed.), 187-210. New 
York: Oxford University Press Inc.  
Ho, P. 2000. China’s rangelands under stress: A comparative study of pasture 
commons in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Development and Change, 31 
(2): 385-412.  
Inner Mongolia. The National People’s Congress. 1984 and 1991. Regulation on 
Grassland Management in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. (In Chinese) 
Inner Mongolia. The National People’s Congress. 2001. Regulation on Xilingol 
National Grassland Nature Reserve. (In Chinese) 
Jim, C.Y. and S.S.W. Xu. 2002. Stifled stakeholders and subdued participation: 
Interpreting local responses toward Shimentai Natural Reserve in South China. 
Environmental Management, 30 (3): 327-341.  
Kellert, S.R., Mehta, J.N., Ebbin, S.A., and L.L. Lichtenfeld. 2000. Community 
natural resource management: Promise, rhetoric, and reality. Society and Natural 
Resources, 13 (8): 705-715. 
Kitchin, R. and N.J. Tate. 2002. Conducting Research in Human Geography: 
Theory, Methodology and Practice. England: Prentice Hall. 
Kolavalli, S. and J. Kerr. 2002. Scaling up participatory watershed management in 
India. Development and Change, 33 (2): 213-235.  
Lane, M. B. and R.E. Rickson. 1997. Resource development and resource 
dependency of indigenous communities: Australia’s Jawoyn aborigines and mining 
at Coronation Hill. Society and Natural Resources, 10 (2): 121-142.  
Leach, M., Mearns, R., and I. Scoones. 1999. Environmental entitlements: 
Dynamics and institutions in community-based natural resource management. 
World Development, 27 (2): 225-247. 
Li, T.M. 1996. Images of community: Discourse and strategy in property relations. 
Development and change, 27: 501-527.  
———. 2002. Engaging simplifications: Community-based resource management, 
market processes and state agendas in upland Southeast Asia. World Development, 
30 (2): 265-283.  
Li, W. 2000. Ecotourisim management in China’s nature reserves. Policy Study on 
Sustainable Management for China’s Nature Reserves, Chinese National 
Committee for Man and Biosphere Programme (ed.), 92-109. Beijing: Scientific 
and Technical Documents Press. (In Chinese) 
Li, W. and N. Han. 2001. Ecotourism management in China’s nature reserves. 
 139
Ambio, 30 (1): 62-63.  
Lieberthal, K. 1997. China’s governing system and its impact on environmental 
policy implementation. In China Environment Series 1, 3-8. Washington, DC.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center. [Online: http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACF4CF.PDF.] 
Lusigi, W.J. 1995. How to build local support for protected areas. In Expending 
Partnerships in Conservation, J.A. McNeely and IUCN (eds.), 19-24. Washington, 
D.C. Covelo, California: Island Press. 
Mayaka, T.B. 2002. Wildlife co-management in the Bénoué National 
Park-Complex, Cameroon: A bumpy road to institutional development. World 
Development, 30 (11): 2001-2016.  
McNeely, J.A. 1995. Partnerships for conservation: An introduction. In Expending 
Partnerships in Conservation, J.A. McNeely and IUCN (eds.), 1-10. Washington, 
D.C. Covelo, California: Island Press. 
Michaelidou, M., Decker, D.J., and J.P. Lassoie. 2002. The interdependence of 
ecosystem and community viability: A theoretical framework to guide research and 
application. Society and Natural Resources, 15 (7): 599-616.  
Ministry of Land and Natural Resources and State Environmental Protection 
Administration. 1995. Land Management Rule for Nature Reserves. (In Chinese) 
Mitchell, B. 2002. Resource and Environmental Management. 2nd Edition. Essex: 
Pearson Education Limited. 
Munro, D.A. 1995. New partners in conservation: How to expend public support 
for protected areas. In Expending Partnerships in Conservation, J.A. McNeely and 
IUCN (eds.), 13-18. Washington, D.C. Covelo, California: Island Press. 
Murphree, M.W. 1994. The role of institutions in community-based conservation. 
In Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-Based Conservation. D. 
Western and R.M. Wright (eds.), 403-427. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.  
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., and J. Walker. (eds.). 1994. Rules, Games, and 
Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Ouyang, Z. 2000. The management regime for China’s nature reserves. In Policy 
Study on Sustainable Management for China’s Nature Reserves, Chinese National 
Committee for Man and Biosphere Programme (ed.), 22-34. Beijing: Scientific and 
Technical Documents Press. (In Chinese) 
Patton, M. Q. 1990. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. 2nd Edition. 
 140
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
———. 2002. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. 3rd Edition. Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
Price, M.F. 1996. People in biosphere reserves: An evolving concept. Society and 
Natural Resources, 9: 645-654.  
Singleton, S. and M. Taylor. 1992. Common property, collective action and 
community. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(3): 309-324.  
State Council. 1994. Nature Reserve Regulation. (In Chinese) 
State Environmental Protection Administration and State Technological 
Supervision Agency. 1993. Principle for Categories and Grades of Nature Reserves. 
(In Chinese) 
State Environmental Protection Administration. 1998. China Ecological and 
Environmental Situation Report 1998.  
State Forestry Agency, Xilingol League Environmental Protection Bureau, Xilingol 
League Forestry Bureau, and Xilingol Biosphere Reserve Management Bureau. 
2003. Management Plan for Xilingol National Grassland Nature Reserve, Xilingol 
League, Inner Mongolia (inner material). (In Chinese)  
State Forestry Agency. 1985. Regulation for Forest and Wildlife Reserves. (In 
Chinese) 
Tashakkori, A. and C. Teddlie. 1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative 
and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.  
Taylor, M. 1998. Governing natural resources. Society and Natural Resources, 11 
(3): 251-258. 
Teddlie, C. and A. Tashakkori. 2002. Major issues and controversies in the use of 
mixed methods in the social and behavioral sciences. In Handbook of Mixed 
Methods in Social and Behavioral Research, C. Teddlie and A.Tashakkori (eds.), 3- 
49. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
The National People’s Congress. 1982. The Constitution. (In Chinese) 
———. 1985. The Rangeland Law. (In Chinese) 
———. 2001. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and 
Treatment of Desertification. (In Chinese) 
Thwaites, R., De Lacy, T., Li, Y., and X. Liu. 1998. Property rights, social change, 
and grassland degradation in Xilingol Biosphere Reserve, Inner Mongolia, China. 
 141
Society and Natural Resources, 11 (4): 319-338. 
UNESCO. [United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.] 
Downloaded 2005. Frequently asked questions on biosphere reserves: What is a 
Biosphere Reserve? The three functions of biosphere reserves. [Online:  
http://www.unesco.org/mab/nutshell.htm.] 
U.S. Embassy Beijing Environment, Science, Technology & Health Section. 2001. 
Grapes of wrath in Inner Mongolia. [Online: 
http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/MongoliaDust-web.htm] 
Venter, A.K. and C.M. Breen. 1998. Partnership forum framework: Participative 
framework for protected area outreach. Environmental Management, 22 (6): 
803-815.  
Wells, M.P. and K.E. Brandon. 1993. The principles and practice of buffer zones 
and local participation in biodiversity conservation. Ambio, 22: 157-162.  
Western, D. and R.M. Wright. 1994. The background to community-based 
conservation. In Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-Based 
Conservation, D. Western, R.M. Wright, and S.C. Strum (eds.), 1-11. Washington, 
D.C. Covelo, California: Island Press. 
Wilshusen, P.R., Brechin, S.R., Fortwangler, C.L., and P.C. West. 2002. 
Reinventing a square wheel: Critique of a resurgent “protection paradigm” in 
international biodiversity conservation. Society and Natural Resources, 15 (1): 
17-40. 
Xu, H. 2000. Study on funding avenues for China’s nature reserves and relevant 
policy recommendations. In Policy Study on Sustainable Management for China’s 
Nature Reserves, Chinese National Committee for Man and Biosphere Programme 
(ed.), 57-71. Beijing: Scientific and Technical Documents Press. (In Chinese) 
Yin, R.K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 2nd Edition. Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage Publications.  
 
 142
APPENDIX I: Questions for interviews with the Xilingol Biosphere Reserve 
Management Bureau and Baiinxile Livestock Farm 
 
 
Organization  
Questions 1-4 will be asked of one person in the Management Bureau (MB): 
1. Could you talk about the administrative management structure in the biosphere 
reserve? 
− What is the relationship between MB and the townships/livestock 
farms/banners/Xilinhot Municipality in the reserve? 
− What are other government units at different levels that have a role in 
managing Xilingol Biosphere Reserve (XBR)? Could you present this 
management structure and indicate where MB fits? 
− What are the responsibilities of MB? To whom is MB responsible? 
2. When was MB set up? By whom? Why? 
3. What is the organizational structure of MB? How many employees in MB? 
How are they selected? 
4. What are the funding resources of MB? 
 
For all interviewees in MB: 
5. Could you talk about your responsibilities in MB? 
 
Land and Resource Rights 
Question 6 will be asked of one person in MB: 
6. Could you talk about the property rights in the transition area of the biosphere 
reserve?  
 
Question 7 will be asked of one person in Baiinxile Livestock Farm (BLF): 
7. Could you talk about the property rights in the farm? 
 
Decision Making  
Question 8-9 will be asked of one person in MB: 
8. Who makes decisions on the land use and management in the core areas, buffer 
zones, and transition area respectively? 
9. Does MB have any power of decision-making in the reserve? What kind of 
decisions can MB make? 
 
Community Participation 
For all interviewees in MB: 
10. What projects or planning initiatives or public processes have MB initiated/led 
that you consider a success?  
What ones have not been successful? 
11. What do you think you can do to improve community participation in managing 
land and resources in the reserve? 
 
For all interviewees in BLF: 
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12. What projects or planning initiatives or public processes have BLF initiated/led 
that you consider a success?  
What ones have not been successful? 
13. What do you think you can do to improve community participation in managing 
land and resources in the farm? 
 
For all interviewees in MB 
14. MB provides information and decision-making to community members through: 
(Circle all that apply) 
Public meetings held by MB ……………………………...1 
Village meetings ……………………………………………2 
Newsletter ..……………………………………………….3 
Poster or flyer ..…………………………………………..4 
Website  …….……………………………………..……5 
Other ….……………………………………………..…...6 
    Specify                   
 
Questions 15-18 will be asked of one person in MB: 
15. When do you hold meetings in the reserve?              
Where?                   
16. About how many meetings do you hold each year?  
1 ………………………………………………………….1 
2 ………………………………………………………….2 
3 ………………………………………………………….3 
4 ………………………………………………………….4 
5 ………………………………………………………….5 
Other ……………………………………………………..6 
Specify                    
17. How many public meetings have you held since the inception of the reserve, 
until this May?  
1 ………………………………………………………….1 
2 ………………………………………………………….2 
3 ………………………………………………………….3 
4 ………………………………………………………….4 
5 ………………………………………………………….5 
Other ……………………………………………………..6 
Specify                    
18. When you hold a meeting, community members are informed through: 
Village meetings  …………………………………..…...1 
Oral notification ………………………..…………………..2 
Newsletter ………………………………………..……….3 
Posting or flyer ……………………..….…….....................4 
Website  .………………………………………………..5 
Other ………………………………………......................6 
Specify                    
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For all interviewees in MB: 
19. How would you describe the attendance of the meetings held by MB? 
Excellent …………………………………………………1 
Very good .………………………………………………...2 
Good ……………………………………………………...3 
Fair  ……………………………………….……………..4 
Poor .……………………………………………….…….5 
20. What do you think the main factor(s) affecting the attendance by community 
members at these meetings? (Circle all that apply) 
Long journey for community members 
to arrive at the meeting places ……….…………………1 
Community members’ being busy in their household work…2 
Community members’ lack of interest in the issues 
about the biosphere reserve ………………………….3 
Community members’ lack of interest in these meetings …..4 
The existence of restrictions for who can participate in  
these meetings ……………………………………..... 5 
Other …………………………………………….………..6 
Specify                   
                                                   
21. The community members can communicate their concerns to you through: 
(Circle all that apply) 
Face to face talk .……………………………………....……1 
Telephone conversation ….……………..…………………2 
Letters …………….……………………...………………...3 
Website or email  …..……………………………………4 
Village officials pass on …………………………………...5 
Other ……………………..………………….....................6 
Specify                          
 
Biosphere Reserve 
For all interviewees in MB: 
22. What are major issues of natural resource management and use in the reserve? 
(Circle all that apply) 
Conflicts between community members and the reserve …..1 
Conflicts among different entities that have a role  
in managing the biosphere reserve ………………….….2 
The policies of Baiinxile Farm ………………………….3 
Tourism development  …………………………………...4 
Animal husbandry …..…………….……………………...5 
Other …………………………….………………………..6 
  Specify                    
 
For all interviewees in MB and BLF: 
23. Has XBR had any impact on land use in the reserve? 
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I don’t know  …………………………………………….1 
No  ………………………………….…………………..2 
Yes  ……………………………………………………...3 
 If your choice is 3, please describe what impacts.         
                         
                     
                     
24. Has XBR resulted in any real landscape changes in the reserve? 
I don’t know  …………………………………………….1 
No  ………………………………….…………………..2 
Yes  ……………………………………………………...3 
 If your choice is 3, please describe what changes.     
                   
                     
                     
25. Has XBR had any impact on land use practices of the communities in the 
transition area? 
I don’t know  …………………………………………….1 
No  ………………………………….…………………..2 
Yes  ……………………………………………………...3 
 If your choice is 3, please specify what communities were impacted.   
                       
                     
                     
   If your choice is 3, please describe what impacts.                  
                       
                     
                     
 
For all interviewees in MB: 
26. In your opinion, what should the biosphere reserve be doing now? 
27. How do communities benefit from the existence of the Xilingol Biosphere 
Reserve? 
28. What do you think are some of the drawbacks for the communities from the 
existence of the Xilingol Biosphere Reserve? 
 
For all interviewees in BLF: 
29. How do communities benefit from the existence of the Xilingol Biosphere 
Reserve? 
30. What do you think are some of the drawbacks for the communities from the 
existence of the Xilingol Biosphere Reserve? 
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